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INTRODUCTION 
Experts predict that the world is going to experience an ever-
increasing number of major environmental emergencies in which one 
or more pollutant(s) is/are released, given our societies’ increasing use 
of pollutants in industry and commerce.1 Furthermore, given many 
States’ increasing populations and urbanization, such events are likely 
to harm an ever-increasing number of people and environments 
exposed to these pollutants.2 Moreover, in our increasingly 
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 1. Linda Malone, Security Council Authority in Environmental Emergencies, 17 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 515, 517 (1996) (discussing three independent studies predicting 
that environmental emergencies were “likely to increase in both frequency and 
magnitude . . . as industrialization and population increased”) [hereinafter Malone, 
Security Council Authority]. 
 2. See id; see also Interpol, STRATEGIC REPORT: ENVIRONMENT, PEACE AND 
SECURITY: A CONVERGENCE OF THREATS, 28 (UNEP ed., 2016) (“The world’s 
population is more than 7 billion people and is expected to exceed 9 billion by 2050. 
With a constantly growing urbanization rate, the pressure put on land is tremendous. 
Land degradation results from excessive use . . . and land pollution . . . This degrades 
the ecosystem and fails to provide for our common needs” and “Air pollution is an 
economic, social, and environmental issue. As a serious health risk, it is responsible 
for approximately 7 million premature deaths per year and constitutes an economic 
drain.”) [hereinafter STRATEGIC REPORT]; A.N.M. Munizzaman, Climate Change: 
Threat to International Peace and Security, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (Apr. 11, 2011), 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/190-issues/50546-climate-
change-threat-to-international-peace-and-security.html [http://perma.cc/RF8B-
Z42T] (“The number of natural disasters in the world may double during the next 10 
to 15 years. Over the past ten years, 3,852 disasters killed more than 780,000 people, 
affected more than two billion others and cost a minimum of $960 billion. . . . 
Between 35 and 77 million of the 165 million Bangladeshis are at risk of drinking 
contaminated water. According to the British medical journal “The Lancet,” up to 77 
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interconnected world, such events are likely to expose an ever-
increasing number of nationals and environments in other States to 
such pollutants.3 At present, the international community does not 
have a workable system that would permit the States that are 
threatened with widespread harm emanating from an environmental 
disaster in another State to protect their own nationals and 
environments.4 This article proposes the adoption of a new treaty that 
would provide such a workable system. 
Throughout this article, a disaster that other States and the 
international community in general should be permitted to assist 
remediate is referred to as a “major international environmental 
emergency” or a “MIEE.” A State that is the site of such an emergency 
is referred to as a “locus State,” and any other State which is threatened 
with major environmental harm from such an emergency is referred to 
as a “target State.” 
Section I of this article discusses four recent environmental disasters 
and their common features. Section II discusses the current 
international legal regime applicable to such disasters. Section III sets 
forth the basic parameters of a new treaty that the international 
community could adopt regarding the investigation and remediation of 
MIEEs. This article takes a cosmopolitan or human rights perspective, 
as opposed to a communitarian perspective.5 However, it should make 
                                                                 
million people have been exposed to arsenic that can cause 2,000,000 to 2,700,000 
deaths from cancer alone in Bangladesh.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Malone, Security Council Authority, supra note 1, at 517, 536 
(“Unfortunately, . . . the threat of future Chernobyls and Bhopals is increasing rather 
than lessening.”); Michael Murphy, Achieving Economic Security with Swords As 
Plowshares, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1181, 1999, at n. 5 (1999) (“Whether overfishing of 
migratory stocks on the high seas threatens a nation’s economic viability or a nuclear 
or chemical accident threatens serious physical harm, states are more likely in the 
future to deal with environmental degradation as a security threat.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Linda Malone, Green Helmets: Eco-Intervention in the Twenty-
First Century, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 19, 38 (2009) [hereinafter Malone, 
Green Helmets]. 
 5. “The root of communitarian thought is that value stems from the community; 
that the individual finds meaning in life by virtue of his or her membership of a 
political community.” CHRIS BROWN, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 55 
(Colum. U. Press 1993). The communitarian view of international law shares many 
of the theoretical bases of the positivist theory of law generally. See, e.g., Carlos 
Santiago Nino, Positivism and Communitarianism: Between Human Rights and 
Democracy, 7:1 RATION JURIS 14 (2007) passim. In contrast, “[w]hat is crucial to a 
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sense to every State and person on the planet that the international 
community needs to adopt a blueprint for how to survive future 
MIEEs. 
I. MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCIES 
A. Recent Accidents 
In this section, four recent major international environmental 
emergencies are discussed. To repeat, the country where such an 
accident occurred is referred to as the “locus State” and other countries 
that the accident harmed or threatened to harm are referred to as the 
“target States.” 
1. MAL Aluminum Plant Accident in Hungary 
The first such accident occurred in Hungary. Specifically, on 
October 4, 2010, a waste storage dam at the Ajkai Timfoldgyar Zrt 
(MAL) aluminum plant in Ajka, Hungary, burst and approximately 
700,000 cubic meters6 (or 24,720,266.7 cubic feet7) of toxic, red 
aluminum sludge8 inundated the towns of Kolontar, Devecser, and 
                                                                 
cosmopolitan attitude is the refusal to regard existing political structures as the 
source of ultimate value. . . . [C]osmopolitanism is a universalist principle [.]” Id. at 
24. The human rights or cosmopolitan view of international law shares many of the 
theoretical bases of the natural law theory of law generally. See, e.g., ROBERT FINE, 
COSMOPOLITANISM 22-28, 56-58 
(Routledge 2008). 
 6. Hungary battles to stem torrent of toxic sludge, BBC (Oct. 5, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11475361 [http://perma.cc/2FDN-848A] 
[hereinafter BBC]. 
 7. Unit Conversion, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/search?q=convert+one+meter+to+feet&oq=convert+one+
mete&aqs=chrome.0.0j69i57j0l4.7679j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 (select 
“Volume” from menu; then search “700,000” with “cubic meter” selected as 
beginning conversion unit and “cubic foot” as end conversion unit). 
 8. The sludge was “a mix of solid impurities, heavy metals such as cadmium, 
cobalt and lead, and the processing chemicals [used to extract aluminum oxide from 
bauxite, the raw material from which aluminum is processed].” Mark Tran, Hungary 
Toxic Sludge Spill an ‘Ecological Catastrophe’ Says Government, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 5, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/05/hungary-toxic-
sludge-spill [http://perma.cc/5LSJ-YS7R]. 
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Somlovasarhely, as well as nearby lands and rivers.9 In places, the 
sludge reached 2.5 meters high,10 and in its path it left behind an eerie 
red stain on buildings, trees, and monuments.11 In the immediate 
aftermath of the disaster, the sludge killed ten people and injured 
approximately 120 people.12 The sludge was highly alkaline and 
caustic to human skin, and inhalation of its dust can cause lung 
cancer.13 It also decimated plants, wildlife, crops, livestock, and fish 
throughout the area.14 Experts concluded that the accident had 
occurred as the result of the designation of the red sludge as non-toxic 
by MAL and the EU, safety violations by MAL operators, and 
Hungarian and EU regulators’ lax enforcement of safety laws.15 
According to Hungary’s Environmental Affairs State Secretary 
Zoltan Illes, the toxic red sludge event was an “ecological 
catastrophe,” and the Government of Hungary declared a state of 
emergency in the counties of Veszprem, Gyor-Moson-Sopron and 
Vas.16 It is estimated that at least 7,000 people were directly affected 
by the spill,17 and clean-up costs are estimated to be between $100 
million and $200 million.18 
                                                                 
 9. Id.; Hungarian Toxic Sludge Reaches Danube River, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 7, 
2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/hungary/8047873/
Hungarian-toxic-sludge-reaches-Danube-river.html [http://perma.cc/GB3V-7BWE] 
[hereinafter TELEGRAPH]. 
 10. See Georg Rast, The Red Sludge Tragedy, 
3-4 DANUBE WATCH 6 (2010), https://www.icpdr.org/main/sites/default/files/nodes/
documents/dw2010_3.pdf. 
 11. See Jennifer Hattam, Haunting Photos of the Hungarian Town a Toxic Sludge 
Spill Painted Red, TREEHUGGER (July 14, 2012), http://www.treehugger.com/
culture/haunting-photos-hungarian-town-toxic-sludge-spill-painted-red-2010.html 
[http://perma.cc/3HQX-KHK9]. 
 12. Rast, supra note 10; BBC, supra note 6. 
 13. Tran, supra note 8. 
 14. Rast, supra note 10; Elizabeth Rosenthal, Hungarian Towns Begin Cleanup 
of Nightmarish Red Sludge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/10/07/world/europe/07hungary.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/LV9N-U5GX]; 
Industrial Spill Accidents: Description, actionguide.info, http://actionguide.info/t/12 
(last visited July 8, 2016) [hereinafter Action Guide]. 
 15. MIKLÓS HARGITAI & BENEDEK JÁVOR, THE KOLONTÁR REPORT: CAUSES 
AND LESSONS FROM THE RED MUD DISASTER, 16, 42-45 (Budapest U. of Tech. & 
Econ. ed., 2011). 
 16. Tran, supra note 8. 
 17. BBC, supra note 6. 
 18. Rast, supra note 10. 
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Furthermore, this event threatened to kill or severely injure humans 
and irreparably harm the ecology in neighboring countries, because the 
sludge flowed into local rivers that empty into the Danube River,19 
which travels through Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, 
and Moldova.20 According to the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, “[t]his incident showed that accidental water 
pollution can have far-reaching transboundary effects even if it 
happens at a location far from any international border.”21 
Understandably, this emergency caused considerable concern 
throughout Europe, especially given that the Government of Hungary 
early in the crisis failed to request or accept assistance from the 
international community.22 Hungary even closed the airspace over the 
site to all flights, except for company and official flights, so that 
outsiders could not monitor the situation.23 Hungary could have 
requested immediate help from any United Nations member or the 
Joint Environment Unit (JEU) of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP)/Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Assistance (OCHA).24 In addition, it could have requested immediate 
assistance from any of the other parties to the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents.25 Instead, Hungary 
waited four days to request any type of assistance, and then it only 
                                                                 
 19. See Hungary’s Toxic Sludge Reaches Danube River, NOVINITE.COM (Oct. 7, 
2010), http://www.novinite.com/articles/120876/Hungary’s+Toxic+Sludge+
Reaches+Danube+River [http://perma.cc/K9Kg-HXWU] [hereinafter 
NOVINITE.COM]. 
 20. See TELEGRAPH, supra note 9; see also Rosenthal, supra note 14; Rast, supra 
note 10. 
 21. Action Guide, supra note 14 (citing Industrial Accidents Convention, About 
the Convention, UNECE (2014), http://www.unece.org/env/teia/about.html). 
 22. See Rosenthal, supra note 14. 
 23. See Hungary Asks EU for Help with Toxic Decontamination, EURACTIV (Oct. 
8, 2010), http://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/hungary-asks-eu-
for-help-with-toxic-decontamination/ [http://perma.cc/F382-RF5V] [hereinafter 
EURACTIV]. 
 24. See text accompanying infra note 517. 
 25. See UNECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents, 21998A1203(01) (Helsinki, Mar. 17, 1992), art. 12, 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2013/TEIA/
1321013_ENG_Web_New_ENG.pdf. 
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requested that its fellow EU members provide between three and five 
experts in the removal of toxic waste.26 
Ultimately, the Hungarian national disaster management directorate 
was able to build several dykes and pour various chemicals into the 
Marcal River, thereby significantly reducing the toxicity of the sludge 
before it reached the Danube.27 However, this was a very alarming 
situation for several European countries, especially because they were 
powerless to ascertain the facts on the ground.28 
2. Fukushima Nuclear Disaster 
On March 10, 2011, the northeastern coast of Japan was struck by a 
magnitude 9 earthquake and then a series of tsunamis ranging up to 
128 feet.29 Within just a few hours, 15,894 people had drowned and 
another 2,500 had disappeared.30 In addition, the earthquake and 
tsunamis caused approximately $300 billion in damage.31 
Furthermore, the earthquake caused the electrical power at the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant outside of Tokyo to fail and 
then the tsunamis caused the backup generators at the plant to fail so 
that the plant lost its cooling ability.32 As a result, three of the plant’s 
six reactors (Reactors 1-3) suffered a meltdown and released high 
levels of radiation into the surrounding air, land and water.33 Various 
                                                                 
 26. EURACTIV, supra note 23. 
 27. Rast, supra note 10; see also NOVINITE.COM, supra note 19; TELEGRAPH, 
supra note 9. 
 28. See EURACTIV, supra note 23. 
 29. Becky Oskin, Japan Earthquake & Tsunami of 2011: Facts and Information, 
LIVESCIENCE (Sept. 13, 2017), http://www.livescience.com/39110-japan-2011-
earthquake-tsunami-facts.html [http://perma.cc/7KTS-63LW]. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. Reactors 4-6 had not been operating at the time of the earthquake and 
tsunamis. Fukushima Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOC. (Oct. 2017), 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-
plants/fukushima-accident.aspx [http://perma.cc/6K8C-8575]. A meltdown is 
considered a level 7 nuclear accident, which is the most serious type of nuclear 
accident, according to the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale 
(INES) scale of such accidents. Fukushima, Chernobyl and the Nuclear Event Scale, 
NUCLEAR ENERGY INST. (2011), http://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-
Archives/fukushima-chernobyl-and-the-nuclear-event-scale [http://perma.cc/S5YF-
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water sources, land areas, and foods grown in Japan were poisoned 
with radiation.34 
Shortly after this disaster, the Government of Japan evacuated 
approximately 160,000 people from the area within twenty kilometers 
from the Fukushima plant.35 Approximately 600 elderly and 
chronically ill people died during this evacuation due to exposure and 
fatigue.36 In addition, although the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic 
Radiation (UNSCEAR) have reported that adverse health effects in 
Japan due to radiation exposure from the Fukushima accident should 
be negligible,37 some doctors and health care workers maintain that the 
                                                                 
5C3W]. A level 7 accident is defined as a “[m]ajor release of radioactive material 
with widespread health and environmental effects, requiring implementation of 
planned and extended countermeasures.” INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INES 4, 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/ines.pdf. 
 34. Mari Saito, Japan Anti-Nuclear Protesters Rally After PM Call to Close 
Plant, REUTERS (May 7, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-nuclear-
idUSTRE74610J20110507 [http://perma.cc/25YT-282T]; Motoko Rich, Struggling 
With Japan’s Nuclear Waste, Six Years After Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/asia/struggling-with-japans-nuclear-
waste-six-years-after-disaster.html?mcubz=1 [http://perma.cc/ UCC8-QM2N]; Ken 
Doyle, Soils Retain, Contain Radioactivity in Fukushima, AM. SOC’Y OF AGRONOMY 
(Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.agronomy.org/science-news/soils-retain-and-contain-
radioactivity-fukushima [http://perma.cc/7QB3-UH6M]. 
 35. Jason Gale, Fukushima Radiation May Cause 1,300 Cancer Deaths, Study 
Finds, BLOOMBERG (July 17, 2002), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2012-07-17/fukushima-radiation-may-cause-1-300-cancer-deaths-study-finds 
[http://perma.cc/87W3-8MTL]. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT FROM THE NUCLEAR 
ACCIDENT AFTER THE 2011 GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI BASED 
ON A PRELIMINARY DOSE ESTIMATION 13, 92-93 (reporting that, for the general 
Japanese population, “[t]he present results suggest that the increases in the incidence 
of human disease attributable to the additional radiation exposure from the 
Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident are likely to remain below detectable levels.” For 
emergency workers at the Fukushima plant, approximately one-third of the workers 
faced a 20% higher risk of thyroid cancer, approximately 1% of the workers faced a 
28% higher risk of leukemia and thyroid cancer, and a few of the workers who 
received high doses of radiation to the thyroid faced a “notable risk of thyroid 
cancer”). See also U.N. SCIENTIFIC COMM. ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION, 
SOURCES, EFFECTS AND RISKS OF IONIZING RADIATION, UNSCEAR 2013 REPORT, 
at 10, U.N. Doc. A/68/46 and Corr. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.14.IX.I (2014), 
http://www.unscear.org/docs/reports/2013/13-85418_Report_2013_Annex_A.pdf 
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Japanese population has experienced and can expect to experience a 
number of health problems attributable to radiation exposure from the 
accident.38 For example, in the years following the accident, thousands 
of Japanese residents reportedly suffered nosebleeds, nausea, and 
fatigue,39 all of which are classic symptoms of radiation poisoning.40 
Furthermore, in tests conducted between 2011 and 2014 in Fukushima 
Prefecture, the incidence of thyroid cancer in children was 
approximately twenty four times the norm.41 Estimates of increased 
                                                                 
(stating that “[n]o increased incidence of radiation-related health effects are expected 
among exposed members of the public or their descendants”) [hereinafter 
UNSCEAR REPORT]. 
 38. See, e.g., Susie Grieves, Tokyo Contaminated & Not Fit for Habitation, 
Doctor Says, PERMACULTURE RESEARCH INST. (Sept. 25, 2014), 
http://permaculturenews.org/2014/09/25/tokyo-contaminated-fit-habitation-doctor-
says/ [http://perma.cc/A6BX-A8DJ] (discussing reports from Dr. Shigeru Mita, who 
has “found increased nosebleeds, hair loss, lack of energy, subcutaneous bleeding, 
visible urinary haemorrhage, skin inflammation, and coughs . . . an increase in 
infectious diseases such as influenza, hand, foot and mouth diseases and shingles . . . 
diseases that had been rare before[,] for example, polymyalgia rheumatic” and lower 
white blood cell counts in children); Joseph Mangano & Janette D. Sherman, The 
Fukushima Health Crisis, COUNTER PUNCH (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/08/01/the-fukushima-health-crisis/ 
[http://perma.cc/6RW2-DM7H] (noting that a Fukushima Medical University study 
had found that 46% of local children had pre-cancerous nodules or cysts and 130 had 
thyroid cancer compared to the 3 expected, although the University asserted in its 
study that these high figures were not necessarily attributable solely to the 
Fukushima disaster). 
 39. Mark LaRosa, Thousands of Japanese Reporting Nose Bleeds From 
Radiation, ORGANIC SLANT (Oct. 12, 2013), https://organicslant.com/thousands-of-
japanese-reporting-nose-bleeds-from-radiation/ [http://perma.cc/LMA2-WCP4]; 
Arnie Gundersen, Nuclear Engineer: Japan’s PM “Lying to the Japanese People” 
About Safety of Fukushima, THE REAL NEWS (Oct. 1, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=
1LVOPSgR1Xk#t=311. 
 40. MEDLINE PLUS, Radiation Sickness, https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/
000026.htm (last visited July 16, 2016). 
 41. See, e.g., Eiichiro Ochiai, The Manga “Oishinbo” Controversy: Radiation 
and Nose Bleeding in the Wake of 3.11, 11 THE ASIA-PACIFIC J., 1, 4-5 (June 23, 
2014), http://apjjf.org/-Eiichiro-Ochiai/4138/article.pdf (discussing data published 
(in Japanese) on the official site of Fukushima Prefecture at http://fukushima-
minamori.jp/). However, the Japanese Government maintains that this higher 
incidence of thyroid cancers in children is unrelated to the Fukushima accident. Id.; 
see also UNSCEAR REPORT, supra note 37, at 11 (reporting that the apparent 
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cancer cases in Japan attributable to the Fukushima disaster range from 
9,600 to 66,000, depending on radiation dose assumptions.42 Without 
question, whatever the exact number of casualties suffered as a result 
of the combined earthquake-tsunamis-nuclear disaster on March 10, 
2011, it was an unimaginable tragedy for Japan. Its people and 
economy will be recovering from this tragedy for many years to 
come.43 
Unfortunately, the Fukushima emergency also threatened to impose 
(and continues to threaten to impose) significant quantities of radiation 
on other nations, especially Japan’s neighbors.44 Under the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Convention on Early 
Notification of a Nuclear Accident (the Early Notification 
Convention),45 Japan was required to immediately notify the IAEA 
and all of the parties to this Convention46 of the accident47 and provide 
specific information regarding the accident.48 For example, it was 
required to indicate the place, time, and nature of the accident, the 
“probable physical and chemical form and the quantity, composition 
and effective height of the radioactive release,”49 and “the assumed or 
established cause and the foreseeable development of the nuclear 
accident relevant to the transboundary release of the radioactive 
                                                                 
increased incidence of thyroid nodules, cysts, and cancers found in children in 
Fukushima Prefecture was due simply to the “modern high-efficiency 
ultrasonography” used during the tests). 
 42. ANGELIKA CLAUSSEN & ALEX ROSEN, 5 YEARS LIVING WITH FUKUSHIMA 2 
(IPPNW Germany & Physicians for Social Responsibility ed., 2016). 
 43. See, e.g., Reuters Staff, Japan’s Kan Says Nuclear Clean-Up Could Take 
Decades, REUTERS (July 9, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-nuclear-
hosono-idUSTRE7680Z520110709 [http://perma.cc/H3KC-7DUP] (reporting on 
Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s declaration that it will be decades before the 
Fukushima plant is cleaned up and decommissioned). 
 44. See text accompanying infra notes 60 – 68, 83. 
 45. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, UNTS 
133/[1987]ATS 14/25 ILM 1369 (1986) (signed in Vienna Sept. 26, 2986) 
[hereinafter Early Notification Convention]. 
 46. See INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, CONVENTION ON EARLY NOTIFICATION 
OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, Mar. 3, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Conventions/cenna_status.pdf (listing parties to the Convention). 
 47. Early Notification Convention, supra note 45, at art. 2(a). 
 48. Early Notification Convention, supra note 45, at art. 5. 
 49. Early Notification Convention, supra note 45, at art. 5(1)(d). 
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materials[.]”50 Japan did notify the IAEA and each of the parties to the 
Early Notification Convention that a nuclear accident had occurred 
following the earthquake and tsunamis on March 10, 2011.51 
Unfortunately, much of the information that Japan and the Tokyo 
Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the main operator of the 
Fukushima plant, provided in this notice and during the five and a half 
years since the accident has been inaccurate.52 
In general, the Government of Japan relied on TEPCO to provide 
information regarding the accident. For two and a half months 
following the accident, TEPCO personnel reiterated that three of the 
reactors at the Fukushima plant had simply suffered “core damage,” 
although they were aware since the date of the accident that each of 
these reactors had in fact suffered a meltdown.53 A meltdown refers to 
a situation where the energy core of a reactor has melted into the 
bottom of the reactor, where it could then melt through the reactor 
basement floor, then melt through the containment structure, and 
ultimately leak high levels of radiation into the ground and ground 
water.54 A scenario where the nuclear fuel has in fact breached the 
containment structure and contaminated the ground water is often 
referred to as a “worst case” nuclear accident.55 
                                                                 
 50. Early Notification Convention, supra note 45, at art. 5(1)(c). 
 51. IAEA, Fukushima Monitoring Database, https://iec.iaea.org/fmd/ (last 
visited July 16, 2016). 
 52. See text accompanying infra notes 53 - 96. 
 53. Associated Press, Fukushima Meltdown Apology: “It was a Cover-Up,” CBS 
NEWS (June 21, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fukushima-tepco-power-
japan-nuclear-meltdown-apologizes-cover-up/ [http://perma.cc/9NFJ-RUFW]. 
 54. Steve Mirsky, Nuclear Experts Explain Worst Case Scenario at Fukushima 
Power Plant, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/fukushima-core/ [http://perma.cc/8TJW-H6JY]; Jenny Marder, Mechanics of 
a Nuclear Meltdown Explained, PBS NEW HOUR (Mar. 15, 2011), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/mechanics-of-a-meltdown-explained/ 
[http://perma.cc/9F4P-HVA6]. 
 55. See, e.g., Mirsky, supra note 54; Mark Sircus, Fukushima – China Syndrome 
– The Worst Case Scenario is Happening, HIGGINS NEWS NETWORK (May 29, 2015), 
http://alexanderhiggins.com/fukushima-china-syndrome-the-worst-case-scenario-
is-happening/ [http://perma.cc/3H89-WRGV]. Such an event is also sometimes 
described as “the China Syndrome.” Id.; see also OXFORD DICTIONARIES, China 
Syndrome, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/china_syndrome (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2017) (defining “China Syndrome” as “[a] hypothetical sequence of events 
following the meltdown of a nuclear reactor, in which the core melts through its 
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Then, in late May of 2011, TEPCO officials finally admitted that, in 
fact, three of its six reactors had suffered a meltdown and probably had 
also breached their inner containment vessels. In addition, they 
admitted that their earlier delay in making this announcement 
constituted a cover-up.56 To this day, the radiation levels at Reactors 
1-3 are so high that TEPCO personnel cannot locate the precise 
location of the core fuel,57 but they maintain that the core fuel at each 
                                                                 
containment structure and deep into the earth[ ]”). This term was first used by U.S. 
nuclear physicist Ralph Lapp in 1971 to refer to a situation where a coolant accident 
in a nuclear reactor in the U.S. would cause the core fuel at the reactor to burn 
through the containment structures and release radioactive material deep into the 
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Cover-Up, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-japan-
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the Groundwater,” FUKUSHIMA WATCH (July 7, 2016), 
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of these reactors probably has not yet breached the outer containment 
structure and reached the ground water.58 Some experts, however, 
believe that the core fuel from one or more of the three reactors has 
already reached the ground water.59 
Similarly, for two and a half years following the accident, TEPCO 
personnel denied that radiation from the Fukushima plant was leaking 
into the Pacific Ocean.60 It was not until July 2013 that the head of 
Japan’s Nuclear Authority admitted that radioactive water has in fact 
been leaking from the Fukushima plant into the Pacific Ocean every 
day since the March 11, 2010 disaster.61 The best estimate today is that 
300,000 tons of radioactive water from the Fukushima plant are 
entering the Pacific Ocean from the Fukushima plant every day.62 Not 
surprisingly, fish in the waters near Fukushima have been found to 
contain high levels of cesium-134, a radioactive isotope.63 
                                                                 
http://www.fukushimawatch.com/2016-05-20-fukushima-fuel-cores-have-melted-
into-the-groundwater-warns-expert.html [http://perma.cc/9NC3-YB4A]; Justin 
McCurry, Fukushima Robot Stranded After Stalling Inside the Reactor, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/
apr/13/fukushima-robot-stalls-reactor-abandoned [http://perma.cc/2Th2-Z3MF]. 
 58. McCurry, Fukushima Nuclear Power, supra note 56. 
 59. White, supra note 57. 
 60. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japanese Nuclear Plant May Have Been Leaking for Two 
Years, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/world/asia/
japanese-nuclear-plant-may-have-been-leaking-for-two-years.html?_r=1& 
[https://perma.cc/DW7V-DZ9F]; Harvey Wasserman, Fukushima Fallout Continues 
to Wreak Havoc, ECO WATCH (July 30, 2013), http://ecowatch.com/2013/07/30/
fukushima-continues-to-wreak-havoc/ [https://perma.cc/Z8DT-3WMT]; Mark 
Wallacy, Fukushima Operators Admit Radioactive Water is Leaking into the Pacific, 
ABC NEWS (July 22, 2013), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-23/fukushima-
operators-admit-radioactive-water-leaked-into-pacific/48366709 
[https://perma.cc/7VLG-YHEK]; Justin McCurry, Fukushima Operator May have to 
Dump Contaminated Water into Pacific, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/10/fukushima-operator-
dump-contaminated-water-pacific [https://perma.cc/5PST-GXW3] [hereinafter 
McCurry, Contaminated Water into Pacific]. 
 61. Tabuchi, supra note 60. 
 62. See, e.g., Gregg Levine, Amid Rampant Waste, Fukushima’s Frozen Wall Up 
in Smoke, ALJAZEERA AMERICA (Mar. 24, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/
blogs/scrutineer/2015/3/24/rampant-waste-fukushima-frozen-wall-up-in-
smoke.html [https://perma.cc/2REU-U7AK]. 
 63. David Susuki, Despite Fukushima, Scientists Say Eating West Coast Fish is 
Safe, THE GA. STRAIGHT (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.straight.com/news/499616/
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Additionally, forty-two fish species off the shores of Japan are now 
considered to be unsafe for human consumption.64 Korea has gone so 
far as to ban imports of all fish caught in Japanese waters.65 In addition, 
in 2014 and 2015, radiation from Fukushima was found in seawater 
collected off the shores of Canada and California.66 Indeed, every 
single bluefin tuna tested off the coast of California was found to 
contain traces of radiation from Fukushima,67 although experts 
maintain that, to date, these traces are too small to endanger human 
health.68 
 
Since March 10, 2011, the Fukushima plant has posed numerous 
other serious threats to the environment. For example, on March 15, 
2011, there was a hydrogen explosion at Reactor 4, leaving the reactor 
in very fragile shape and susceptible to another meltdown, further 
explosions, or radiation releases in a subsequent earthquake, tsunami, 
aftershock, or industrial accident.69 In addition, TEPCO generates 
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approximately 400 tons of radioactive water each day,70 and it has not 
discovered a way to remove the radiation from this water.71 
Accordingly, it is storing this water in thousands of underground and 
above-ground storage containers,72 but it is running out of space to 
build such containers.73 Furthermore, some of these containers have 
sprung leaks.74 Following several such leaks, in a stunning reversal of 
Japan’s policy at that time, Japan’s Prime Minister in October 2013 
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issued a plea to the international community to assist TEPCO in 
stopping such leaks.75 
To date, probably the most serious problem at Fukushima apart from 
the simultaneous meltdown at three of its reactors, was that, following 
the March 10, 2011 earthquake and tsunamis and a March 12 explosion 
at Reactor 4, 1,331 spent fuel rods, together with between 202 and 204 
full fuel rods, were perched precariously in a cooling pool 100 feet in 
the air at Reactor 4. Given the fragile condition of this cooling pool 
and Reactor 4 in general, the pool could have collapsed, especially 
during a subsequent earthquake, aftershock, explosion, or tsunami.76 
Furthermore, the cooling pool simply could have malfunctioned, and 
then the fuel rods contained therein would have been exposed to the 
air and likely caught fire.77 Therefore, it was imperative that the fuel 
rods be moved to a more secure location.78 In late 2013, TEPCO 
announced that it was going to commence this process of moving the 
fuel rods.79 At the time, confidence in TEPCO’s abilities was so low 
and fear of a disastrous accident during the operation so high that 
several nuclear experts signed a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon, requesting that the United Nations appoint a group of 
nuclear experts to perform the extraction operation instead.80 
Ultimately, TEPCO successfully transferred all of the fuel rods to a 
more secure location at the Fukushima plant by the end of 2014, 
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without the U.N.’s assistance.81 Many nuclear experts, however, 
believed that the world had narrowly escaped an enormous nuclear 
disaster.82 
Without question, the simultaneous meltdowns of three reactors, the 
enormous leaks of radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean, and the 
continuing risk of further meltdowns, explosions and radiation releases 
all continue to pose a very significant threat of environmental harm to 
the people of Japan and the world.83 Yet, there is no recognized 
international legal regime to protect the people of the world following 
such a significant environmental accident.84 
Following the March 10, 2011 earthquake and tsunamis, the 
Government of Japan permitted foreign nuclear experts to enter Japan 
and conduct independent radiation tests.85 However, for the most part, 
TEPCO forbade foreign experts from entering the Fukushima 
complex, so these experts could only guess at what was actually 
happening inside the plant based on their radiation readings of nearby 
air, soil, and water.86 In addition, the Government of Japan could have 
requested assistance from any number of nations and international 
organizations, but during the years immediately following the 
accident, Japan attempted to handle the crisis itself.87 In fact, the 
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Government of Japan has simply deferred to TEPCO to handle the 
disaster,88 even though TEPCO had permitted the disaster to happen in 
the first place,89 has engaged in cover-ups to hide the severity of the 
situation from the Japanese population and the rest of the world,90 and, 
in many experts’ opinion, is failing in its attempts to decommission the 
Fukushima plant.91 
An independent study commissioned by the Diet (national 
legislature) of Japan concluded that the nuclear disaster at Fukushima 
was a man-made and not a natural disaster.92 In particular, it found that 
TEPCO overlooked repeated warnings of “the high possibility of 
tsunami levels reaching beyond assumptions made at the time of 
construction, as well as the possibility of core damage in the case of 
such a tsunami.”93 The report also found that TEPCO had failed to 
establish adequate back-up power and cooling systems at the plant.94 
The report also stated that the Fukushima disaster made very clear that 
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the nuclear regulatory system in Japan had failed to ensure that 
Fukushima was operated in a safe manner.95 This failure was due to 
the historically close relationship between nuclear regulators and 
nuclear plant operators in Japan and the conflict of interest the Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has in simultaneously 
promoting the use of nuclear power and ensuring the safety of nuclear 
power operations.96 
The Fukushima disaster brought home to many people around the 
world the increasingly dangerous nature of our highly interconnected 
world97 as well as the lack of international institutions capable of 
protecting the various populations and environments affected by a 
major international environmental emergency.98 Both the United 
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation 
(UNSCEAR) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
possess a role in response to a nuclear accident, but neither has any 
real enforcement power.99 In fact, there are no international nuclear 
safety regulations which the IAEA or any other international agency 
can enforce.100 
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The UNSCEAR was established by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1955,101 and its mandate is “to undertake broad 
assessments of the sources of ionizing radiation and its effects on 
human health and the environment. . . .”102 However, the UNSCEAR 
“has no power to set radiation standards nor make 
recommendations.”103 
The IAEA was established as an autonomous international 
organization by the IAEA Statute on October 23, 1956, and it became 
operational on July 29, 1957.104 Its mandates are to promote the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy, prevent the use of nuclear energy for 
any military purpose, and encourage countries to adopt nuclear safety 
standards.105 
The only obligations that a party to the IAEA Statute possesses are 
that it must report a nuclear incident or accident to the IAEA and the 
States “which are or may be physically affected” by the accident,106 
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notify the IAEA of the experts, equipment and materials that it could 
make available to other parties in an emergency,107 notify any party 
requesting assistance in an emergency whether it is in a position to 
provide that assistance,108 and “establish and maintain a legislative and 
regulatory framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations.”109 
In short, like the UNSCEAR, the IAEA does not possess the power to 
ensure the safety of nuclear plants or the power to manage post-
accident control and clean-up activities.110 The IAEA is often 
portrayed as an advocate of nuclear power,111 and, in any case, its dual 
mandates to promote the peaceful use of nuclear power and promote 
the safety of nuclear power plants arguably create a conflict of 
interest.112 During the Fukushima disaster, for example, the IAEA was 
criticized for being slow to disseminate meaningful information and 
quick to defend TEPCO’s and Japan’s actions.113 There are even 
reports that IAEA personnel were aware within a few weeks of the 
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 108. Id. 
 109. Convention on Nuclear Safety, art. 7(1), 1963 UNTS 293, S Treaty Doc. No. 
104-6 (1995); 33 ILM 1514 (1994) (signed in Vienna June 17, 1994), art. 7(1). 
 110. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Safety Standards Series: 
Legal and Governmental Infrastructure for Nuclear, Radiation, Radioactive Waste 
and Transport Safety: Requirements, No. GS-R-1, 2, http://www-pub.iaea.org/
MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1093_scr.pdf (“The IAEA’s safety standards are not 
legally binding on Member States but may be adopted by them, at their own 
discretion, for use in national regulations in respect of their own activities.”). 
 111. “The Nuclear Energy Department fosters the efficient and safe use of nuclear 
power by supporting existing and new nuclear programmes around the world, 
catalyzing innovation and building indigenous capability in energy planning, 
analysis, and nuclear information and knowledge.” IAEA.org, About the Nuclear 
Energy Department, https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/Main/about.html (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2017). 
 112. Christian MacPherson, A Big Conflict of Interest in the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, NUCLEAR NEWS (June 4, 2011), https://nuclear-news.net/
2011/06/04/a-big-conflict-of-interest-in-the-international-atomic-energy-agency/ 
[https://perma.cc/SDL2-3K6K]. 
 113. Julian Borger, UN’s Nuclear Watchdog IAEA under Fire over Response to 
Japanese Disaster, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2011/mar/15/nuclear-watchdog-response-japanese-disaster 
[https://perma.cc/Q3TC-SFAN]. 
2017] BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL 241 
 
Fukushima accident that Reactors 1-3 had suffered a meltdown and yet 
the IAEA failed to disclose this information to the public or even the 
parties to the IAEA Statute.114 
3. BP Oil Spill 
According to previous United States President Obama, the United 
States experienced its most serious environmental emergency115 on 
April 20, 2010, when the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling platform 
suffered a gas leak and exploded.116 Deepwater Horizon was located 
off the coast of the continental U.S., in the Gulf of Mexico, but within 
the U.S.’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).117 The explosion 
immediately killed eleven people, injured 17 more, and completely 
demolished the Deepwater Horizon facility.118 Moreover, while the 
world watched in horror, the Deepwater Horizon oil well leaked at 
least 36,667 barrels119 (1,540,014 gallons)120of oil per day into the Gulf 
                                                                 
 114. Washingtonsblog, Declassified U.S. Government Report Prepared a Week 
after Fukushima Accident: “100% of The Total Spent Fuel Was Released to the 
Atmosphere from Unit 4”, WASHINGTON’S BLOG (Dec. 10, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2015/12/declassified-u-s-government-report-
week-fukushima-accident-100-total-spent-fuel-released-atmosphere-unit-4.html 
[https://perma.cc/7CWC-EU7M]. 
 115. Drew Griffin et al., 5 Years after the Gulf Oil Spill: What We Do (and Don’t) 
Know, CNN, (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/14/us/gulf-oil-spill-
unknowns/ [https://perma.cc/X3UJ-5GL5]. 
 116. Deepwater Horizon Accident and Response, BP, https://www.bp.com/en_us/
bp-us/community/commitment-to-the-gulf-of-mexico/deepwater-horizon-
accident.html (last visited July 19, 2016). 
 117. Rebecca K. Richards, Deepwater Mobile Oil Rigs in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and the Uncertainty of Coastal State Jurisdiction, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & LAW 387, 
388-389 (2011). 
 118. Richard Pallardy, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill of 2010, Encyclopedia 
Britannica (2017), https://www.brittanica.com/event/Deewater-Horizon-oil-spill-
2010 (last visited Aug. 20, 2017). 
 119. This figure is based on the fact that the accident lasted 87 days and the 
estimated number of barrels of oil that were released into the Gulf throughout those 
87 days is 3.19 million. See, e.g., NOAA, Deepwater Horizon Trustees Announce 
Draft Restoration Plans for Gulf of Mexico Following 2010 Disaster, NOAANEWS 
(Oct. 5, 2015) (based on U.S. Coast Guard figures) [hereinafter NOAA, Deepwater 
Horizon]; see also Griffin, supra note 115. 
 120. This figure is based on the number of barrels released per day (see NOAA, 
Deepwater Horizon, supra note 119), multiplied by 42, as there are 42 gallons in 
each barrel of crude oil. History of the 42-Gallon Oil Barrel, AMERICAN OIL & GAS 
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of Mexico for 87 straight days, for a total of at least 3.19 million 
barrels121 (or 134 million gallons)122 of oil, until the main operator of 
the well, British Petroleum (BP), finally was able to plug the leak.123 
Exposure to this oil as well as to an oil dispersant called corexit used 
during the cleanup process caused thousands of clean-up personnel and 
residents of the Gulf of Mexico coastal areas to suffer serious health 
problems, including severe rashes, nausea, headaches, and respiratory 
tract infections.124 In addition, many of the coastal areas of five U.S. 
States - Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, and Florida – were 
ecologically decimated, and local residents suffered billions of dollars 
in damages for lost property and income.125 BP’s civil settlement with 
the U.S. Department of Justice, the five Gulf states, and over 400 local 
government entities for $20.8 billion was the largest ever 
                                                                 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY (2017), http://aoghs.org/transportation/history-of-the-42-
gallon-oil-barrel/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2017); Larry Shaughnessy, Not All the Oil in 
the Gulf is Coming from BP’s Spill, CNN (July 10, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/
US/06/10/csi.gulf.oil.spill/ [https://perma.cc/9XT2-6MBQ]. 
 121. Gulf Oil Spill, OCEAN PORTAL SMITHSONIAN NATʼL MUSEUM OF NATURAL 
HISTORY, http://ocean.si.edu/gulf-oil-spill (last visited Aug. 15, 2016); NOAA, 
Deepwater Horizon, supra note 119. 
 122. NOAA, Deepwater Horizon, supra note 119. 
 123. These estimates are on the low side. At one point, the U.S. Government 
claimed that more than 60,000 barrels per day poured into the Gulf at the height of 
the disaster, (Pallardy, supra note 118) and ultimately the U.S. Government 
estimated that 4.2 million barrels spilled into the Gulf over the course of the accident. 
Griffin, supra note 115. A study conducted by Timothy Crone, a marine geophysicist 
at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Laboratory, estimated that a total 
of 4.4 million barrels of oiled spilled into the Gulf. Rosanne Skirble, Scientists 
Estimate 4.4 Million Barrels of Oil Escaped BP’s Broken Well, VOA (Sept. 22, 
2010), https://www.voanews.com/a/scientists-estimate-44-million-barrels-of-oil-
escaped-broken-well-103641884/169578.html [https://perma.cc/NR4Z-GBKT]. BP 
claimed that the amount of oil that leaked into the Gulf was much lower, and a federal 
court ultimately held BP liable for leaking 3.1 million barrels into the Gulf. See, e.g., 
Griffin, supra note 115. 
 124. Dahr Jamail, BP Dispersants ‘Causing Sickness’, ALJAZEERA, (Oct. 29, 
2010), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2010/10/20101027132136220
370.html [https://perma.cc/H2CG-Q3JQ]. 
 125. See, e.g., Svati Kirsten Narula, BP Will Pay a Record-Breaking $18.7 Billion 
Settlement for the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, QZ (July 2, 2015), 
https://qz.com/443792/bp-will-pay-a-record-breaking-18-7-billion-settlement-for-
the-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill/ [https://perma.cc/3UAV-LKU3]. 
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environmental settlement amount and the largest civil settlement with 
a single entity in the U.S.126 
Moreover, the oil spill (and use of the dispersant corexit) severely 
impacted the entire ecosystem of the Gulf of Mexico.127Several coastal 
                                                                 
 126. See, e.g., Campbell Robertson et al., BP to Pay $18.7 Billion for Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/07/03/us/bp-to-pay-gulf-coast-states-18-7-billion-for-deepwater-horizon-oil-
spill.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/X3Y7-K79H]. BP entered into a civil 
settlement for $20.8 billion to cover the claims of the U.S. Department of Justice, the 
five Gulf states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas, and more 
than 400 local government entities. See, e.g., Loren Grush, BP Fine a Record $20.8 
Billion for Oil Spill Disaster, THE VERGE (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.theverge.com/
2015/10/5/9454393/bp-oil-spill-record-fine-doj-settlement [https://perma.cc/46Y3-
P9DC]; BP to Pay More Than $20 Billion in Record Gulf Oil Spill Settlement, FOX 
NEWS (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/10/05/bp-to-pay-more-
than-20-billion-in-gulf-oil-spill-case-largest-settlement-in-us.html 
[https://perma.cc/WUA4-Y2LS] [hereinafter Fox News Report]. Of this amount, 
$5.5 billion was attributable to Clean Water Act penalties. See id. The remainder was 
intended to compensate the five Gulf states and local governments for environmental 
and economic damage. See Robertson, supra note 126. In addition, BP paid a 
criminal penalty of between $4 billion and $4.5 billion. Id.; see also Narula, supra 
note 125.  As of 2015, BP had also paid between $5.8 billion and $9 billion for 
damage claims to individuals and private companies. See Narula, supra note 125; 
Fox News Report, supra note 126. Transocean, Halliburton, and Anadarko all paid 
similarly large civil and criminal penalties to the U.S. Government and/or U.S. 
plaintiffs. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Transocean Agrees to Plead Guilty to Environmental 
Crime and Enter Civil Settlement to Resolve U.S. Clean Water Act Penalty Claims 
from Deepwater Horizon Incident; JUSTICE NEWS (Jan. 3, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/transocean-agrees-plead-guilty-environmental-
crime-and-enter-civil-settlement-resolve-us [https://perma.cc/H6WZ-6JAG]; Daniel 
Gilbert, Halliburton to Settle Deepwater Horizon Claims for $1.1 Billion Agreement 
Settles Majority of Claims Related to 2010 Rig Explosion in Gulf of Mexico, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/halliburton-to-settle-deepwater-
horizon-claims-for-1-1-billion-1409664524 [https://perma.cc/B3J3-QBE6]; 
Richards, supra note 117. Mexico’s lawsuit against BP for damages is still pending. 
Nina Lakhani, BP Faces Mexican Class Action Lawsuit over Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2015/dec/11/bp-gulf-oil-spill-mexico-lawsuit-deepwater-horizon 
[https://perma.cc/MZ9L-Y3MJ]. 
 127. DEEPWATER HORIZON NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
TRUSTEES, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND RESTORATION PLAN 
(PDARP) AND FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
(PEIS), 2016, http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/restoration-planning/gulf-
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wetlands were severely damaged,128 and the spill appears to have 
affected the deep ocean even more than it affected the coastlines along 
the Gulf of Mexico.129 At the time of the accident, a few dozen Bryde’s 
whales lived in the Gulf of Mexico.130 Almost half of this population 
was affected by the oil spill, and “nearly a quarter were likely 
killed.”131 All twenty-one species of dolphins in the Gulf suffered 
“demonstrable . . . injuries[,]” half of the bottlenose dolphin 
population was killed,132 and it is estimated that it will take 
“approximately one hundred years for the spinner dolphin population 
to recover.”133 Approximately 167,000 sea turtles were killed, the 
recent recovery of the endangered Kemp’s Ridley sea turtle was halted, 
and approximately a quarter of the floating Sargassum seaweed that is 
home to many juvenile sea turtles was destroyed.134 
Between two and five million larval fish were killed,135 and 
numerous species of fish, including red snapper, southern flounder, 
                                                                 
plan (last visited July 20, 2016)) [hereinafter NOAA Report on Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill]. 
 128. Restoring the Gulf, Nat’l Wildlife Federation, https://www.nwf.org/Our-
Work/Waters/Gulf-Restoration (last visited Jan. 20, 2018) (discussing NOAA Report 
on Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill]) [hereinafter NWF, Restoring the Gulf]. 
 129. See Office of Response and Restoration, At the Bottom of the Gulf of Mexico, 
Corals and Diversity Suffered After Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, The Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill: Five Years Later, NOAA, http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/
about/media/bottom-gulf-mexico-corals-and-diversity-suffered-after-deepwater-
horizon-oil-spill.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2016); Craig Pittman, Three Years After 
BP Oil Spill, USF Research Finds Massive Die-Off, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 5, 
2013), http://www.tampabay.com/news/environment/water/gulf-oil-spill-killed-
millions-of-microscopic-creatures-at-base-of-food/2113157 [https://perma.cc/
MPV6-A7HS]. 
 130. NWF, Restoring the Gulf, supra note 128. 
 131. Id. Ultimately, the Natural Resources Defense Council petitioned the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency to have the Bryde’s whale listed on the 
Endangered Species List. See Balaenoptera edeni as endangered under the 
Endangered Species Act, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, PETITION TO 
LIST THE GULF OF MEXICO’S BRYDE’S WHALE (BALAENOPTERA EDENI) AS 
ENDANGERED UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, Sept. 18, 2014, 
https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/wil_14091701a.pdf. 
 132. NWF, Restoring the Gulf, supra note 128. 
 133. NWF, Restoring the Gulf, supra note 128. 
 134. NWF, Restoring the Gulf, supra note 128. 
 135. “Larval Fish” is the term for fish between the time they are hatched and they 
have attained all of their fin rays and started to grow scales. A.W. KENDALL ET AL., 
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redfish, and killfish, suffered deformities including unusual lesions, 
rotting fins, and oil in their liver.136 At least 102 species of birds were 
harmed by the oil spill, with the most negatively affected being brown 
and white pelicans, laughing gulls, Audubon’s shearwaters, northern 
gannets, clapper fails, black skimmers, white ibis, double-crested 
cormorants, common loons, and several specifies of tern.137 
Much of the sea floor of the Gulf of Mexico was affected by the oil 
spill, and experts estimate that it will be many decades or even 
hundreds of years for sea bottom dwellers to recover.138 For example, 
approximately 8.3 million oysters were killed, and five different coral 
colonies were damaged.139 In addition, tiny, amoeba-like creatures 
called foraminifera that live at the bottom of the ocean were especially 
impacted. 140  Foraminifera are a source of food for clams and other 
creatures at the bottom of the food chain, so their decimation 
jeopardizes the entire marine food chain in the Gulf of Mexico.141 
The ecology of the Gulf of Mexico and residents of nearby 
coastlines clearly suffered the lion’s share of harm from this accident, 
but this accident also harmed and threatened to harm marine and 
                                                                 
EARLY LIFE HISTORY STAGES OF FISHES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS, American 
Society of Ichthyologists and Herpetologists, Special Publication 1: 11-22, 
http://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/pef2/002744900023343.pdf. 
 135. NWF, Restoring the Gulf, supra note 128. 
 136. NWF, Restoring the Gulf, supra note 128. 
 137. NWF, Restoring the Gulf, supra note 128; see also Center for Biological 
Diversity, A Deadly Toll: the Gulf Oil Spill and the Unfolding Wildlife Disaster (Apr. 
2011), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/public_lands/energy/dirty_
energy_development/oil_and_gas/gulf_oil_spill/a_deadly_toll.html (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2017). 
 138. Center for Biological Diversity, supra note 137. 
 139. NWF, Restoring the Gulf, supra note 128. 
 140. See, e.g., S.B. Joye et al., Microbial Dynamics Following the Macondo Oil 
Well Blowout across Gulf of Mexico Environments, 64 Bioscience 766 (2014); 
Claudia Dreifus, Revisiting the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.21, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/science/22conversation.html?mcubz=1 
[https://perma.cc/SH6J-6CQS]; Pittman, supra note 129; David Kirby, Corexit, Oil 
Dispersant Used By BP, Is Destroying Gulf Marine Life, Scientists Say, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/25/corexit-by-oil-
dispersant_n_3157080.html [https://perma.cc/6VHX-KHZL]. 
 141. Kirby, supra note 140. 
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coastal habitats around the world.142 Given the currents in the Gulf of 
Mexico, the oil slick threatened to harm coastal areas along the U.S. 
eastern seaboard and western Europe.143 Between 700 and 1,200 miles 
of the Gulf of Mexico sea bottom – far outside of the U.S. exclusive 
economic zone – was covered in oil.144 Sea turtles throughout the 
Atlantic appear to have been harmed,145 and the Government of 
Mexico is suing BP and other defendants for significant ecological 
harm that four Mexican states allegedly have suffered.146 
The Deepwater Horizon accident was an international accident in 
other ways as well. The accident occurred in the northern Gulf of 
Mexico, within the area of the U.S.’ exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ).147 However, the EEZ is located beyond the U.S.’ territorial 
waters,148 and much of the Gulf of Mexico which was harmed in the 
accident constitutes the “common heritage of mankind” owned by all 
countries.149 The rig that exploded was owned by Transocean Ltd, a 
                                                                 
 142. Ocean pollution accidents generally are considered to be international 
incidents, because ocean currents dispense the pollution long distances around the 
world. See, e.g., Marissa Smith, The Deepwater Horizon Disaster: An Examination 
of the Spill’s Impact on the Gap in International Regulation of Oil Pollution from 
Fixed Platforms, 25 EMORY L. REV. 1477, 1477, n.8 (2011) (citing Kate Galbraith, 
Gap in Rules on Oil Spills from Wells, INTʼL HERALD TRIBUNE (May 17, 2010)). 
 143. See, e.g., Press Release, Natʼl Center for Atmospheric Research & U. Corp. 
for Atmospheric Research, Ocean Currents Likely To Carry Oil Along Atlantic 
Coast, National Center for Atmospheric Research (June 3, 2010), 
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along-atlantic-coast [https://perma.cc/EB4V-BSCQ]; Joshua Rapp Learn, Gulf Spill 
May Have Affected Sea Turtles Across Atlantic, THE WILDLIFE SOCIETY (Jan. 11, 
2016), http://wildlife.org/gulf-spill-may-have-affected-sea-turtles-across-atlantic/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y6FK-83P2]. 
 144. Joye et al., supra note 140; NWF, Restoring the Gulf, supra note 128. 
 145. See N.F. Putman et al., Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Impacts on Sea Turtles 
Could Span the Atlantic, 11 BIOLOGY LETTERS 12 (2015); see also Learn, supra note 
143. 
 146. Lakhani, supra note 126. 
 147. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. For a definition of the exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ), see UNCLOS, Arts. 55–57. 
 148. “Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a 
limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in 
accordance with this Convention.” Id. at art. 3. 
 149. Id. at art. 136. 
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Swiss company,150 which had registered the rig as a vessel “sailing” 
the high seas under the flag of the Republic of the Marshall Islands 
(RMI).151 As the country under whose flag the vessel was registered, 
the RMI was responsible for enforcing safety regulations on the rig.152 
BP and Anadarko, the co-owners of the well,153 are U.K. and U.S. 
companies, respectively,154 and Halliburton, which had installed 
cement around the well at the bottom of the sea floor,155 is a U.S. 
company.156 
Various studies have concluded that the accident was caused by a 
combination of (1) overconfidence of BP, Transocean, Halliburton, 
and Anadarko and their consequent safety violations; (2) poor 
government oversight, especially by the U.S. and the RMI; (3) the 
absence of a plan to cope with an oil spill of the magnitude of the 
Deepwater Horizon tragedy; and (4) the absence of an effective 
international regulatory scheme concerning deepwater oil wells 
operating far from the shores of any national government.157 As one 
commentator explained the situation: 
                                                                 
 150. See, e.g., Jef Feeley & Allen Johnson, Jr., BP, Transocean Accused of 
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 154. BP PLC, https://www.britannica.com/topic/BP-PLC (last visited Aug. 20, 
2017); Anadarko Petroleum Corporation History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/anadarko-petroleum-
corporation-history/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2017). 
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ST. J. (May 27, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870402620
4575266560930780190 [https://perma.cc/84QQ-GT8U]. 
 156. History of Halliburton, HALLIBURTON http://www.halliburton.com/en-US/
about-us/history-of-halliburton-of-halliburton.page?node-id=hgeyxt5y (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2017). 
 157. See, e.g., Robert L. Cavnar, Preliminary Deepwater Horizon Report Rips 
Transocean, Marshall Islands, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 23, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-l-cavnar/preliminary-deepwater-hor_b_
852932.html, [https://perma.cc/WQ7U-S892]; James B. Meigs, Blame BP for 
Deepwater Horizon. But Direct Your Outrage to the Actual Mistake., SLATE (Sept. 
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The reality is that both BP and Transocean had grown 
dangerously overconfident and were pushing too close to the 
edge. Perhaps overly impressed by the team’s good safety 
record, [U.S.] federal regulators routinely rubber-stamped 
the BP/Transocean proposals. Moreover, despite claims to 
the contrary, none of the drilling companies in the Gulf had 
a workable scheme to cope with a massive oil spill. The 
entire industry had succumbed to risk creep: over the 
decades, drillers gradually moved into deeper waters and 
sunk wells that involved much greater internal pressures and 
hazards. The technologies and regulations originally 
developed for shallow waters were updated in response, but 
not to a degree commensurate with the growing risks. So, 
even as drillers were getting more proficient, disaster was 
becoming more, not less, likely.158  
The fact that no international treaty addresses an “explosion of or 
leak from a fixed, offshore oil platform”159 is particularly alarming, 
given that experts estimate that today there are 417 off-shore oil rigs 
operating in the world, 100 more than were operating in 2010 at the 
time of the Deepwater Horizon accident.160 In addition, approximately 
63 of these rigs are deepwater rigs operating in the Gulf of Mexico, far 
from any national government.161 Furthermore, there are 
approximately 27,000 abandoned oil and gas wells located in the Gulf 
of Mexico that could be leaking oil and gas, with no government or 
company monitoring these abandoned wells.162 
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visited Aug. 7, 2016). 
 161. Wendy Koch, Is Deepwater Drilling Safer, 5 Years After Worst Oil Spill, 
NATʼL GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 20, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/04/
150420-bp-gulf-oil-spill-safety-five-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/9XTP-VM5Z]. 
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Despite the gravity of the Deepwater Horizon accident, the U.S. 
never requested that the United Nations or any other multilateral 
organization organize clean-up efforts.163 The Federal Aviation 
Authority instituted a no fly-zone over the oil spill, and the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security reportedly denied media access to 
the area, at least for a period of time.164 Photographers complained that 
BP similarly restricted media access to the accident site.165 In addition, 
the U.S. declined more offers of assistance from other countries and 
international bodies than it accepted,166 and, although the Department 
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2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/143771.htm; Jena Baker McNeill et al., 
Accepting Disaster Relief from Other Nations: Lessons from Katrina and the Gulf 
Oil Spill, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/
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of Homeland Security appointed the U.S. Coast Guard to direct the 
cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon spill,167 the Obama White House 
allowed BP itself to fix the gushing well168 and at least initially seemed 
to defer to BP to organize clean-up operations.169 Unfortunately, the 
U.S. Government’s initial trust in BP was misplaced. After 
contributing to the accident and failing to stop the leak quickly, BP 
repeatedly misrepresented the severity of the incident, and ultimately 
paid a settlement of $525 million to the Securities and Exchange (SEC) 
for inaccurate statements made in its SEC filings regarding the number 
of barrels of oil per day that had flowed into the Gulf of Mexico as a 
result of the accident.170 Halliburton, another of the culpable parties, 
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demonstrated its own bad faith when it destroyed evidence in 
connection with the Deepwater Horizon accident.171 
4. Indonesian Fire Crisis 
The final accident discussed here involves Indonesia. As Eric 
Meijaard, an associate professor at the University of Queensland, 
stated in October 2015, “BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010 
looks relatively benign compared to Indonesia’s 2015 fire crisis . . . 
and that was one heck of a spill.”172 At the time of the Indonesian fire 
crisis in 2015, in fact, he urged the world to acknowledge the crisis for 
what it was: “the biggest environmental crime of the 21st century.”173 
During the dry season from approximately June through September in 
each of the last several years,174 thousands of fires have raged out of 
control in Indonesia, blanketing Southeast Asia, and especially 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, in a dense haze that causes severe 
respiratory infections and many deaths.175 Due to a strong El Nino 
weather pattern, the fires were the most horrific during the 2015 dry 
season.176 
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Most of the fires in Indonesia are started intentionally by individual 
farmers or enormous farming concerns which want to clear their land 
so that they can grow lucrative crops such as palm oil plants.177 
Unfortunately, much of the material that these farmers burn is carbon-
rich peat, which, when burned, emits large quantities of carbon, which 
greatly exacerbate global warming.178 It’s estimated that, each day, 
these fires emit “more carbon dioxide than the entire U.S. 
economy.”179 Furthermore, the peat forests in question are one of the 
richest sources of biodiversity on the planet, and in 2015 alone the fires 
destroyed more than 8,000 miles of such forests.180 These fires have 
even threatened the survival of the orangutan.181 
The Indonesian Government initially claimed that the 2015 fires 
were responsible for 19 deaths and approximately 500,000 respiratory 
tract infections182 but later revised the death toll to 24.183 These figures 
are nowhere close to the casualty figures reported by experts. For 
example, one study conducted by researchers at Harvard and Columbia 
Universities concluded that just one of the toxic substances emitted 
during the 2015 fires - particulate matter known as PM 2.5 - caused 
approximately 100,300 premature deaths of adults in Indonesia 
(91,600 deaths), Malaysia (6,500 deaths), and Singapore (2,200 
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deaths).184 Greenpeace cautioned that even these figures don’t capture 
the true scope of the disaster, because the researchers did not study the 
effects of other toxins contained in the dense haze caused by the 2015 
fires. Moreover, they did not study the effects of PM 2.5 on children, 
one of the groups most at risk of harm from such a particulate.185 An 
Indonesian local health agency admitted that an infant had been killed 
because of the haze.186 The researchers also did not study the effects 
of this particulate on people in other countries affected by the 2015 
haze, including Cambodia, India, the Philippines, and Thailand.187 
Another study conducted by researchers in the U.S., the U.K., 
Singapore and Indonesia found that 69 million people in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore alone were exposed to the deadly haze in 
2015.188 The researchers estimated between 6,153 and 17,270 deaths 
occurred as a direct result.189 While the 2015 Indonesian fires were 
especially deadly, many people in Indonesia and nearby countries die 
each year from exposure to Indonesia’s toxic haze.190 
“The World Bank estimates that the 2015 fires cost Indonesia at least 
16.1 billion US Dollars equivalent to 1.9 percent of 2015 Gross 
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Domestic Product (GDP).”191 This is “more than double the sum spent 
on rebuilding Aceh after the 2004 tsunami.”192 Singapore estimates 
that the 2015 Indonesian fires alone cost Singapore $S700 million 
dollars.193 Going all the way back to 1997, the Indonesian fires cost 
Malaysia approximately RM 129 million in healthcare expenses.194 
Without question, as CNN reported in a September 2015 article, the 
annual Indonesian fires are “a global problem with huge economic, 
health and climate costs.”195 
Once thousands of fires are raging each year, Indonesian officials 
often claim that they are doing the best that they can to stamp out so 
many simultaneous fires,196 falsely suggesting that many of the fires 
were started naturally.197 However, numerous commentators have 
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complained that Indonesia could do much more to prevent the start of 
so many fires in the first place.198 Furthermore, Indonesia often has 
resisted outside assistance, in any given year, once the fires have 
become widespread.199 For example, under the ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution (hereinafter the “AATHP”),200 during 
the 2015 dry season Indonesia could have requested that the ASEAN 
Co-ordinating Centre for Transboundary Pollution Control assist it in 
combatting the thousands of fires ablaze throughout the country.201 
Instead, Indonesia declined to do so and only requested assistance from 
Singapore, Malaysia, Russia, China and Australia in October 2015 
after insisting for several months that it could handle the situation 
itself.202 
                                                                 
history-forest-fires [https://perma.cc/3MKY-AZXV] (stating that “[n]early all forest 
fires In Indonesia are human-caused”); Balch, supra note 182 (indicating that the 
fires are intentionally set by large and small operations as a way to clear forests for 
agricultural production). 
 198. See, e.g., Erik Meijaard, No More Fires in Indonesia?, MONGABAY (June 20 
2016), https://news.mongabay.com/2016/06/no-more-fires-in-indonesia/ [https://
perma.cc/XK4A-GUL2] (Dr. Hadi Daryanto, the Director General of Social Forestry 
in the Indonesian Ministry of Environment and Forestry, explained that “there is 
insufficient government funding to prevent fires . . . fire prevention is not a priority 
for local-level government at the province or district level . . . and . . . local elites 
benefit from using fires in land speculation.”). 
 199. Indonesia Says It Has Enough Resources to Combat Haze, Declines Help, 
ASIA ONE (Oct. 2, 2015), http://news.asiaone.com/news/singapore/indonesia-says-
has-enough-resources-combat-haze-declines-help#sthash.X4efWHqU.dpuf 
[https://perma.cc/ED2U-AJVP]; Audrey Tan, Jakarta Again Declines Singapore’s 
Help to Fight Haze, THE STRAITS TIMES: ASIA (Sept. 18, 2015 5:00 AM), 
http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/environment/jakarta-again-declines-
singapores-help-to-fight-haze [https://perma.cc/F6JD-BCAP]. 
 200. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, 
Oct. 12, 2006, art. 5 § 2 [hereinafter AATHP]. Indonesia finally deposited its 
instrument of ratification of the AATHP in January of 2015. Ratification of Asean 
Haze Agreement a Historic Step in Tackling Problem: Malaysia PM Najib Razak, 
THE STRAIT TIMES: ASIA (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-
asia/ratification-of-asean-haze-agreement-a-historic-step-in-tackling-problem-
malaysia-pm [https://perma.cc/63HA-JSG9] [hereinafter Ratification of Asean Haze 
Agreement]. 
 201. See Ratification of Asean Haze Agreement, supra note 200. 
 202. Kanis Dursin, ASEAN Agreement on Haze? As Clear as Smoke, INTER PRESS 
SERV.: ASIA-PACIFIC (Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.ipsnews.net/2015/10/asean-
agreement-on-haze-as-clear-as-smoke/ [https://perma.cc/JM2L-2D9F]. 
256 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIX 
 
In light of Indonesia’s inability or unwillingness to control these 
fires, the governments of nearby countries, such as Singapore, have 
resorted to drastic measures to protect their own populations. For 
example, Singapore closed its schools for weeks at a time, advised its 
residents to stay indoors, and seeded the clouds above its own 
territories in order to produce rain to diminish the haze over its 
territories.203 
Since 2015, Indonesia has stepped up its enforcement of its no-
burning laws, which carry criminal penalties.204 For example, in 
August 2016, a three-judge panel ordered the Indonesian company, PT 
National Sago Prima, to pay a record 1 trillion rupiah ($107 million) 
fine for causing the 2015 fires.205 
It is too early to assess the effect of Indonesia’s new enforcement 
efforts. However, many commentators do not hold out much hope that 
the situation will improve dramatically. This is so because Indonesia 
was the last country to sign and ratify the AATHP,206 the 2015 fire 
season following Indonesia’s ratification of the AATHP was one of 
the worst on record,207 fires continued to rage during the 2016 and 
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2017 dry seasons,208 Indonesia’s environment minister did not even 
attend the 12th conference of the parties to the AATHP on August 11, 
2016,209 and a number of the companies setting the fires have close 
relationships with powerful national and local officials.210 
5. Common Themes of Accidents 
In each of the above-described accidents, one or more private 
companies in one State (the locus State) released one or more 
pollutants into the air, land or water.211 The pollutant(s) caused or 
threatened to cause irreparable harm to the nationals and/or the 
environment of other States (the target States).212 Also, in the 
immediate aftermath of the accidents, it was not clear that the locus 
State could ensure that the pollutant(s) would not reach the target 
States.213 For purposes of this article, a pollutant is defined as an 
artificial substance, such as a pesticide or PCB, that contaminates air, 
water, or soil such that humans, animals, or plants are harmed, or a 
naturally-occurring substance, such as oil, carbon dioxide, or radiation, 
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that, in a given environment, occurs in a concentration that is harmful 
for humans, animals or plants.214 
None of these accidents was caused by a natural disaster, although, 
with respect to the Fukushima and Indonesian fire disasters, this 
initially might have appeared to be the case.215 In each of the accidents, 
there were no international safety standards that an international 
organization could have enforced to prevent the accident, and the 
direct cause of each of the accidents was a combination of one or more 
private companies’ safety violations and authorities’ lax enforcement 
of national and/or regional safety laws.216 Furthermore, the authorities’ 
lax enforcement of safety standards may have been attributable to 
close relationships between regulatory authorities and the culpable 
private parties.217 
In each of these accidents, representatives of the target States 
generally were not permitted to enter the locus State and visit the 
accident site or participate in remediation or clean-up activities.218 The 
target States even found it difficult to obtain accurate information 
regarding the accident and the likelihood that the pollutants in question 
would reach their borders.219 Furthermore, in each of the accidents, the 
locus State actually declined the great majority of assistance offered to 
it by other States and international bodies.220 
Unfortunately, history is replete with examples of countries 
declining offers of outside assistance in the face of an industrial 
accident or natural disaster.221 In any of those circumstances, the 
national government often attempts to justify its “go it alone” approach 
on the international principle of “sovereignty” (in this case, over the 
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 221. See, e.g., Tyra Ruth Saechao, Natural Disasters and the Responsibility to 
Protect, 32 BROOK, J. INT’L L. 663, 665 (2007) (“The lack of international legal 
obligations pertaining to disaster response is troubling, particularly when disaster-
affected States delay or prevent the provision of relief. . . .”). 
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use of its natural resources).222 However, as discussed further in 
Section II of this article, this principle must be tempered against the 
equally important principle that each country “must not use its natural 
resources in a manner that will cause harm beyond its borders.”223 This 
balanced approach to the use of natural resources is reflected in 
numerous multilateral environmental agreements today.224 
In any case, when a national government declines external 
assistance, typically the government is not concerned with “national 
sovereignty” but with fear that the population’s support for the 
government may weaken as a result of contact with foreigners.225 
Other reasons why a State suffering a major environmental disaster 
might not want to permit foreigners near the accident site are a desire 
to avoid bad publicity226 and prevent foreigners from obtaining 
evidence to support damage claims for injuries suffered by foreign 
States and nationals.227 
In the case of the toxic red sludge in Hungary, the national 
government took control of the company that caused the accident, 
diluted the toxin so that it no longer presented a danger to neighboring 
                                                                 
 222. See, e.g., Alison McCormick, From Sovereignty to Responsibility: An 
Emerging International Norm and Its Call to Action in Burma, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL L. 
STUDIES 563, 563-64 (2011) (discussing the Government of Myanmar’s refusal to 
permit delivery of foreign aid to its people following the devastating cyclone Nargis). 
 223. See infra § II. 
 224. See infra § II. 
 225. See, e.g., ROBERT DAYLEY, SOUTHEASTERN ASIA IN THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL ERA 69 (Westview Press 2016) (stating that “[f]or one long week 
following the storm [Cyclone Nargis], Myanmar’s government refused international 
disaster relief over fears that foreign aid workers would engage in political 
espionage”). 
 226. See, e.g., J. MICHAEL COLE, CONVERGENCE OR CONFLICT IN THE TAIWAN 
STRAIT: THE ILLUSION OF PEACE? 74-75 (Routledge 2017). 
 227. See, e.g., RUWANTISSA ABEYRATNE, STRATEGIC ISSUES IN AIR TRANSPORT: 
LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS 304, n.50 (Springer 2012) (discussing 
“blocking legislation” which prevents “private information being demanded and 
obtained from nationals of a State by another State”); see also Robert V. Percival, 
Liability for Global Environmental Harm and the Evolving Relations Between Public 
and Private Law, Environmental Law Workshop, 1 (May 4, 2010) (stating that 
“[w]hen harm is caused by pollution originating in another country, it is even more 
difficult to hold polluters accountable because public international law has yet to 
create an effective global regime of liability for transboundary pollution . . . .”). 
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countries, and organized clean-up efforts.228 In the case of the 
Fukushima disaster in Japan and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the 
U.S., the national government primarily relied on the major culpable 
private party – TEPCO and BP, respectively - to slow spread of the 
toxins and conduct clean-up operations.229 Finally, TEPCO and BP 
repeatedly downplayed the severity of the accident.230 In addition, in 
the case of the annual fires in Indonesia, the Indonesian national 
government has directed firefighting efforts, but some critics maintain 
that these efforts are lackluster at best.231 
Given the increasing number of major international environmental 
emergencies around the world and the terrific harm that such 
emergencies can inflict on foreign populations and environments,232 
the international community needs to implement a workable system 
for permitting a multilateral force to enter an environmental disaster 
site to assist in the investigation and remediation of the disaster. While 
the next section of this article reveals that the U.N. Security Council 
and a target State currently possess the power to enter a locus State for 
this reason, at present, entries by both a multilateral force and a target 
State are problematic.233 Moreover, entry by a multilateral force would 
be preferable.234 The final section of this article proposes such a 
workable system. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON MULTILATERAL OR UNILATERAL ENTRY 
INTO THE LOCUS STATE WITHOUT THE LOCUS STATE’S PERMISSION 
This section addresses whether, under current international law, 
either a target State, or a U.N.-backed multilateral force, could enter a 
locus State, without its permission, to investigate and then remediate a 
MIEE. The pivotal provision in the U.N. Charter (UNC) on this 
question is the prohibition against the threat or use of force contained 
in Article 2(4).235 Also relevant are the major international 
                                                                 
 228. See supra § I.A.1. 
 229. See supra §§ I.A.2-I.A.3. 
 230. See supra §§ I.A.2-I.A.3. 
 231. See supra § I.A.4. 
 232. See supra § I.A. 
 233. See infra § II. 
 234. See infra § III; see also Knight, infra note 322, at 1553-54. 
 235. U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
2017] BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL 261 
 
environmental laws,236 Article 2(7) of the UNC,237 Chapter VII of the 
UNC,238 the customary international law principle of self-defense,239 
and Article 51 of the UNC.240 It is the contention of this article that 
various private property law principles are relevant as well.241 The 
major international environmental laws are discussed first. Then, each 
of the other legal principles is discussed. This section concludes that, 
under the proper circumstances, a U.N.-backed multilateral force or a 
target State could enter a locus State without the locus State’s 
permission to investigate and then remediate a MIEE. However, both 
types of entry are extremely problematic. Accordingly, a new treaty 
for handling possible MIEEs is proposed in the final section of this 
article. 
A. Major International Environmental Laws 
Customary international law provides that each country possesses 
the sovereign right to utilize its natural resources as it sees fit.242 This 
principle is considered a jus cogens norm, meaning “a fundamental 
legal norm[ ]from which no derogation is permitted.”243 It also has 
been reaffirmed in numerous treaties.244 At the same time, this 
                                                                 
 236. See infra § II.A. 
 237. U.N. Charter art. 2(7). 
 238. U.N. Charter Ch. VII. 
 239. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-[defense]. . . .”). 
 240. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 241. See infra § II.C.2.v.b. 
 242. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources (Dec. 14, 1962) (“The right of peoples and nations to 
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in 
the interest of their national development and the well-being of the People of the 
State concerned.”); see also NICO J. SCHRIJVER, Fifty Years Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources: The 1962 UN Declaration as the Opinio Iuris Communis, 
in PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 27 (eds. Marc 
Bungenberg & Stephan Hobe, Springer 2015) (citing Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2005, at 168). 
 243. James A. Green, Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the 
Use of Force, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 215, 216 (2011) (quoting Hilary Charlesworth & 
Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 63 (1993)). 
 244. SCHRIJVER, supra note 242, at 24-26 (discussing several treaties 
acknowledging this customary international law principle). 
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principle is tempered by the equally important customary international 
law principle that no country can utilize its natural resources in a 
manner that harms either another country or any territory shared in 
common with all countries (the common heritage of mankind).245 This 
is known as the “no harm rule.” Numerous multinational and regional 
environmental treaties acknowledge the balanced approach of these 
two principles.246 For example, the preamble of the U. N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (the UNFCCC) states that: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.247  
Furthermore, the polluter-pays principle (PPP), which provides that 
a State that harms the environment of another State or the common 
heritage of mankind is obligated to make reparations for that harm,248 
is founded on the “no harm rule.”249 In sum, under current international 
                                                                 
 245. See, e.g., Michael Murphy, supra note 4, at 1187-89 (citing numerous 
sources, including, for example, the Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.) (1941), 
3 U.N. R.I.A.A. 1938 (1949) and the International Court of Justice’s Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Decision, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 241-42). 
 246. SCHRIJVER, supra note 242, at 27. 
 247. United Nations General Assembly, Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1 (May 15, 1992). 
 248. See, e.g., Jon M. Van Dyke, Liability and Compensation for Harm Caused by 
Nuclear Activities, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 13, 18 (2008) (noting that the PPP 
is codified in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 
16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1 (Jan. 1, 1993), which reads: “National 
authorities should endeavour to promote the internationalization of environmental 
costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the 
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public 
interest and without distorting international trade and investment.”). 
 249. Despite this principle, victims of cross-border pollution rarely receive 
compensation from the polluter(s) for their injuries due to the “robust and persistent 
procedural hurdles to transboundary tort litigation. The hurdles include obtaining 
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environmental law, when an environmental disaster in the locus State 
harms the environment or nationals of the target State, the locus State 
generally is violating international law and owes the target State 
damages for the same. 
In addition to the “no harm principle” and the “polluter-pays 
principle,” two other customary international environmental principles 
are particularly relevant to this article. These principles are the 
“precautionary principle” and the “duty to cooperate.”250 The 
precautionary principle is codified in Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration, which states: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as 
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.251  
The “duty to cooperate” means that “States are required to co-
operate with each other in controlling transboundary pollution and 
                                                                 
personal jurisdiction over foreign firms, extraterritorial service of process, the local 
action rule (which provides that actions in tort for damages to real property must be 
brought where the property is located), resolving choice of law questions, 
overcoming motions to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens, deciding 
whether a defendant’s governmental permit is relevant to its tort liability, and 
enforcing judgments. For pollution that flows across borders, the locus delicti, or 
place of the tort, is often hotly disputed. Added to these legal barriers is the practical 
problem of the expense of bringing suit against a foreign entity and proving its 
negligence. . . . Together, these legal hurdles form . . . a liability wall – a set of legal 
barriers that serves to insulate domestic firms from foreign suits over environmental 
damage.” Noah M. Sach, Beyond the Liability Wall: Strengthening Tort Remedies in 
International Environmental Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 837, 848-49 (2008) (citations 
omitted). Furthermore, on account of these procedural hurdles, “[m]ore than a dozen 
civil liability treaties have been negotiated that create causes of action and prescribe 
liability rules, but few have entered into force, and most remain unadopted orphans 
in international environmental law.” Id. at 837. 
 250. Van Dyke, supra note 248, at 18-23. 
 251. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1), Principle 25 (Aug. 12, 
1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
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environmental risks.”252 Principle 24 of the Stockholm Declaration 
articulates this principle as follows: 
International matters concerning the protection and 
improvement of the environment should be handled in a co-
operative spirit by all countries, big and small, on an equal 
footing. Cooperation through unilateral or bilateral 
arrangements or other appropriate means is essential to 
effectively control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse 
environmental effects resulting from activities conducted in 
all spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of the 
sovereignty and interests of all States.253  
“The duty to [cooperate] . . . includes the duty to notify other 
affected countries, the duty to exchange information, the duty to listen 
to the concerns of affected countries, the duty to respond to these 
concerns, and the duty to negotiate in good faith.”254 Both the 
precautionary principle and the duty to cooperate principle are 
incorporated in numerous international treaties.255 
B. Prohibition Against Threat or Use Force; Prohibition Against 
Interference in Domestic Affairs of Any State 
Following the horrendous loss of life in World War II, the primary 
motivation for establishment of the U.N. was the maintenance of 
international peace.256 The League of Nations, which had been 
established following World War I257 and only permitted the League 
                                                                 
 252. Van Dyke, supra note 248, at 21-21 (quoting Alan E. Boyle, Nuclear Energy 
and International Law: An Environmental Perspective, 60 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 257, 
278 (1990)). 
 253. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Declaration 
of Principles, Principle 24, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972). 
 254. Van Dyke, supra note 248, at 21. 
 255. Van Dyke, supra note 248, at 19 (discussing the precautionary principle), 21 
(discussing the duty to cooperate). 
 256. See, e.g., Anna M. Vradenburgh, The Chapter VII Powers of the United 
Nations Charter: Do They Trump Human Rights Law, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 175, 181 (citing several sources). 
 257. Treaty of Versailles, 225 Parry 188; 2 Bevans 235; 13 AJIL Supp. 151, 385 
(1919) arts. 1-26; see also The League of Nations, 1920, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office 
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of Nations Council to recommend, rather than order, that States take 
specific actions to restore peace,258 clearly had failed to prevent 
another world war.259 Accordingly, the negotiators of the UNC decided 
to grant the U.N. Security Council tremendous power to actively 
prevent and stop future armed conflicts between sovereign States.260 
The primary mechanism included in the UNC for maintaining the 
peace between member States is Article 2(4),261 which reads: 
All members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.262  
This general prohibition against the use of force applies to the U.N. 
itself.263 
                                                                 
of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-
1920/league (last visited Aug. 5, 2017). 
 258. See, e.g., ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE USE OF FORCE BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 49 (Routledge 1993). 
 259. See, e.g., Duncan Wilson & Elizabeth Wilson, FEDERATION AND WORLD 
ORDER 24 (Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. 1939). 
 260. See, e.g., Wolfgang Weiβ, Security Council Powers and the Exigencies of 
Justice after War, in Y.B. U.N. L. 12, at 50 (Koninklijke Brill N.V. 2008); see also 
Jared Schott, Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council Action and the Regulative 
Ideal of Emergency, 6 N.W. J. INT. HUMAN RIGHTS 24, 54, 63-66, 77 (2008) (noting 
that courts have recognized the Security Council’s “myriad implied powers”, the ICJ 
possesses no general or plenary power to review the Security Council’s Chapter VII 
resolutions, the ICJ has been deferential in reviewing the Security Council’s Chapter 
VII resolutions, and judicial review of Security Council’s Chapter VII resolutions in 
general has been very weak). 
 261. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of 
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168 ¶ 148 (Dec. 19) (referring to 
Article 2(4) as the “cornerstone of the United Nations Charter”); Diane Desierto, 
NECESSITY AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY CLAUSES: SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN 
TREATY INTERPRETATION 285 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) (stating that 
Article 2(4) is the “linchpin prohibition against the use of force”). 
 262. U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
 263. U.N. Charter art. 42 (the Security Council can authorize the use of force only 
after determining that measures not involving the use of force under Article 41 
“would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate”). 
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Closely related to Article 2(4) of the UNC is Article 2(7) of the 
UNC, which reads: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter. . . . 264  
This principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of any 
State has been interpreted to apply to individual States, as well as the 
U.N. as a whole.265 While both the prohibition against the threat or use 
of force and the prohibition against the intervention in the domestic 
affairs of any State are codified in the UNC (and in many other 
treaties266), they also are long-established principles of customary 
                                                                 
 264. U.N. Charter art. 2(7). 
 265. See, e.g., U.N. General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, GA/RES/25/2625, adopted October 24, 1970 
[hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations] (“No State or group of States has the 
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or 
external affairs of any other State”); Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986, I.C.J. Rep., 14, 
¶ 202 (27 June) (ICJ stating that the non-intervention principle is a corollary of the 
principle of the sovereign equality of States) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case]; see also 
Sir Michael Wood, The Principle Of Non-Intervention In Contemporary 
International Law, CHATHAM HOUSE, Feb. 27, 2007 (“While not expressly set out in 
the UN Charter, it is generally held to be implicit in various of its provisions, in 
particular the principle of the sovereign equality of States (Article 2.1).”), 
http://studylib.net/doc/8433936/the-principle-of-non-intervention-in (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2017); Philip Kunig, Prohibition of Intervention, MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Apr. 2008, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1434 (last visited Aug. 5, 2017) (“Concerning inter-State relations, 
the non-intervention principle is not mentioned as such in the UN Charter. It can, 
however, implicitly be drawn from it as the corresponding duty to the principle of 
State sovereignty in art. 2(1) UN Charter.”). 
 266. See, e.g., Charter of the Organization of American States, arts.16, 18, 19; 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, art. 4; Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and 
Mutual Assistance, art. 1(2). 
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international law. The prohibition against the threat or use of force 
enjoys the status of jus cogens.267 
The distinction between “the threat or use of force,” on the one hand, 
and “intervention in the domestic affairs of a State,” on the other hand, 
is very important for this article. As discussed further below, if a target 
State’s entry into a locus State without permission does not constitute 
a “threat or use of force,” that entry might be justified as a 
proportionate intervention in response to the locus State’s intervention 
in affairs of the target State by virtue of the environmental 
emergency.268 On the other hand, if such an entry into the locus State 
by a target State constitutes a “threat or use of force,” that entry 
arguably is legal only if the environmental emergency in the locus 
State is considered an “armed attack.”269 
The Charter does not define either “threat or use of force” in Article 
2(4) or “non-intervention” in Article 2(7). However, the U.N. General 
Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations (“Declaration on Friendly 
Relations”)270 is considered to be an authoritative expression of the 
customary international law regarding these phrases.271 While the 
                                                                 
 267. See Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 190 (prohibition against threat or 
use of force), ¶ 202 (non-intervention in a State’s domestic affairs), ¶ 190 (noting 
that the International Law Commission had expressed the view that “the law of the 
Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a 
conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus 
cogens”) (citation omitted); Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force against Terrorists, 
20 E. J. INT’L L. 359, 359 (2009); see also Green, supra note 243, at 216 (questioning 
the peremptory nature of the prohibition against the threat or use of force but 
conceding that “an overwhelming majority of scholars view the prohibition as having 
a peremptory character”). 
 268. See text accompanying infra notes 300-301. 
 269. As discussed further below, Article 51 of the UNC requires an armed attack 
before a State can threaten or use force against another State. It is possible that the 
customary international law principle of self-defense likewise contains such a 
requirement. See infra § II.C.2.i-iii. 
 270. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 265. 
 271. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at 188-202 (stating that the U.N. members’ 
adoption of the text of the Declaration on Friendly Relations indicates their belief 
that the prohibition against the threat or use of force and the prohibition against 
intervention in the domestic affairs of another State are opinion juris (or legally 
binding)); see also C. Don Johnson, Toward Self-Determination – A Reappraisal As 
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Declaration on Friendly Relations likewise does not provide a 
definition of either phrase, it lists specific actions that fall within each 
category. For example, the Declaration on Friendly Relations states 
that the following, among others, constitute “threats or uses of force:” 
[T]he threat or use of force to violate the existing 
international boundaries of another State or as a means of 
solving international disputes, including territorial disputes 
and problems concerning frontiers of States. . . . 
[A]cts of reprisal involving the use of force. . . . 
[A]ny forcible action which deprives peoples . . . of their 
right to self-determination and freedom and 
independence. . . . 
[O]rganizing or encouraging the organization of irregular 
forces or armed bands including mercenaries, for incursion 
into the territory of another State. . . . 
[O]rganizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of 
civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in 
organized activities within . . . [the] territory of another 
State] directed toward the commission of such acts, when 
the acts referred to . . . involve a threat or use of force. . . . 
[M]ilitary occupation resulting from the use of force. . . . 
The territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition 
by another State resulting from the threat or use of force. No 
territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force 
shall be recognized as legal. . . .272  
                                                                 
Reflected In The Declaration On Friendly Relations, 3 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 145, 
146 (1973) (noting that the Chairman of the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General 
Assembly, in the General Assembly’s 25th Session, referred to the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations as “the greatest [document] since the Charter of the United 
Nations itself”); Michael Wood, International Law and the Use of Force: What 
Happens in Practice?, 53 INDIAN J. INT’L LAW 345, 351-52 (2013) (referring to the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations as a “consensus resolution” of the U.N. General 
Assembly). Note that, in order for a principle to constitute customary international 
law, it must be generally followed by States and furthermore States must consider it 
to be a legally binding principle, or opinio juris. See United Nations, Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 18 April 1946, http://www.refworld.org/
docid/3deb4b9c0.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2017). 
 272. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 265. 
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In contrast, the Declaration on Friendly Relations lists the following 
as examples of “intervention in the domestic affairs of a State,” among 
others: 
[Intervention] directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other 
State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms 
of interference or attempted threats against the personality 
of the State or against its political, economic or cultural 
elements, are in violation of international law. . . . 
[The] use or encourage[ment of] the use of economic 
political or any other type of measures to coerce another 
State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the 
exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure advantages of 
any kind. 
Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite 
or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed 
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, 
or interference in civil strife in another State. 
The use of force to deprive peoples of their national 
identity. . . . Every State has an inalienable right to choose 
its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without 
interference in any form by another State.273 
As indicated, the above examples in the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations suggest that the prohibition against a threat or use of force 
in international law refers to a threat or use of force regarding a State’s 
territorial integrity or political independence. On the other hand, the 
above examples in the Declaration on Friendly Relations indicate that 
the prohibition against intervention in the domestic affairs of another 
State prohibits not only such threats or uses of force but also any 
interference whatsoever with a State’s physical boundaries or political 
independence. 
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The ICJ’s opinion in The Nicaragua Case274 confirms this 
distinction between the two principles.275 In The Nicaragua Case, 
Nicaragua sued the U.S., claiming that a wide range of U.S. actions 
against Nicaragua violated international law.276 The main U.S. 
activities about which Nicaragua complained included the laying of 
mines in Nicaragua’s harbors and territorial seas,277 attacks on a 
number of Nicaragua’s ports, oil installations, and a naval base,278 the 
funding, arming, and training of the Contras,279 and implementation of 
a trade embargo against Nicaragua, denial of economic assistance to 
Nicaragua, and reduction in the U.S. sugar quota for Nicaragua.280 
The U.S., in turn, claimed that all of its actions were justified by 
Nicaragua’s provision of arms to rebel forces in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua’s military incursions into Costa Rica and Honduras.281 
Specifically, the U.S. claimed that El Salvador, Costa Rica, and 
Honduras had considered Nicaragua’s activities to constitute illegal 
aggression and had requested that the U.S. defend them against this 
aggression, in accordance with the customary international law 
principle of self-defense and the collective defense pact contained in 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Inter-
American Treaty).282 
                                                                 
 274. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 15. 
 275. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 205 (meaning of prohibition against 
intervention in domestic affairs of a State), ¶ 227 (meaning of prohibition against 
threat or use of force). 
 276. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 15. 
 277. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 215. 
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of the U.S. had had “effective control” over the Contras’ actions so as to render such 
crimes imputable to the Government of the U.S. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at 
¶¶ 113-116, 216. 
 281. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶. 19, 129-130, 164-165, 248. 
 282. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶ 126, 211. It is noteworthy that the U.S. 
did not rely on the right of collective defense contained in Article 51 of the UNC or 
Article 21 of Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS and Charter of 
the OAS). Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶ 24, 56. This is because the U.S., 
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In discussing the meaning of the customary international 
prohibitions against intervention and against the threat or use of force 
(the essence of which are incorporated into Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of 
the UNC, according to the ICJ283), the ICJ stated that both of these 
prohibitions are “closely linked” with the principle of respect for State 
sovereignty.284 The ICJ went on to emphasize that “the principle of 
non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct 
its affairs without outside interference. . . . ‘Between independent 
States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of 
international relations.’’’285 The ICJ further clarified that the 
prohibition against intervention: 
forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or 
indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A 
prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on 
matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of 
State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice 
of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the 
formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when 
it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which 
must remain free ones. . . . The element of coercion . . . 
defines, and indeed forms the very essence of prohibited 
intervention.286 
                                                                 
when it had acceded to the Statute of the ICJ, had filed a reservation denying, with 
few exceptions, the ICJ’s jurisdiction to decide disputes under multilateral treaties 
such as the UNC and the Charter of the OAS. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶ 
56, 173-175, 292. The U.S.’ acceptance of jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice on August 26, 1946, made pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute 
of the Court, contained “a proviso [c] excluding from its application: ‘disputes 
arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) al1 parties to the treaty affected by the 
decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of 
America specially agrees to jurisdiction.’’’ Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 42. 
 283. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶ 187-190, 202-214. 
 284. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 212. 
 285. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 202 (quoting Corfu Channel (U.K. v. 
Alb.), Judgment (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 35 (9 Apr.) [hereinafter Corfu Channel 
Case]. 
 286. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 205. 
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A prohibited threat or use of force under customary international law 
is a prohibited intervention in the domestic affairs of another State, as 
a threat or use of force constitutes the coercion which is a necessary 
component of an illegal intervention.287 In other words, an act which 
violates the prohibition against a threat or use of force by definition 
likewise violates the prohibition against intervention in the domestic 
affairs of another State.288 The ICJ also pointed out that not every use 
of force constitutes an “armed attack.”289 As explained further below, 
a use of force must be of sufficient “scale and effects” to constitute an 
armed attack.290 Examples of armed attacks include, but are not limited 
to, action by regular armed forces across an international border as 
well as the sending by one State of irregular forces “‘to carry out acts 
of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount 
to’ . . . an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces[.]”291 The 
ICJ, relying on the Declaration on Friendly Relations, noted that an 
example of a prohibited threat or use of force that does not constitute 
an armed attack is a threat or use of force to violate the existing 
international boundaries of another State.”292 
In The Nicaragua Case, the ICJ held that a State, when it has been 
the target of illegal intervention, possesses a right to proportionately 
intervene in the domestic affairs of the aggressor State.293 At the same 
time, the ICJ concluded that this right of proportionate, retaliatory 
intervention was unavailable to the U.S. in the instant case, because 
this right does not extend to a third party justifying its actions under 
the principle of collective self-defense.294 The ICJ also held that 
Nicaragua had not proven that the U.S. trade embargo, denial of 
economic aid, or reduction in the U.S. sugar quota for Nicaragua had 
violated any international law.295 In particular, the ICJ noted, there 
could be a number of legal justifications for such U.S. actions and 
typically the legality of such actions is determined by other 
                                                                 
 287. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 205. 
 288. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 205. 
 289. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶ 191, 195. 
 290. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 195. 
 291. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 195. 
 292. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 191. 
 293. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 248. 
 294. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 249. 
 295. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶ 123-125, 244-245. 
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organizations (e.g., General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) 
dispute panels) to which the ICJ defers on such questions.296 
On the other hand, the ICJ held that all of the remaining U.S. actions 
against Nicaragua, including its provision of funding to the Contras 
(apart from its provision of humanitarian aid after October 1, 1984), 
had violated the customary international law prohibition against 
intervention in the domestic affairs of another State.297 Furthermore, 
the Court held that the U.S.’ laying of mines in Nicaragua’s harbors 
and territorial seas, attacks on Nicaragua’s ports, oil installations, and 
naval base, and arming and training of the Contras had violated the 
customary international law prohibition against the threat or use of 
force.298 Significantly, the ICJ held that the U.S. funding of the 
Contras was only an illegal intervention into Nicaragua’s affairs, while 
the arming and training of the Contras constituted an illegal threat or 
use of force against Nicaragua. Finally, the ICJ held that none of the 
U.S.’ actions could be justified under the collective defense provision 
of the Inter-American Treaty or the customary international law 
principle of self-defense.299 
Applying the above law to the legality of a target State’s entry into 
a locus State to investigate and possibly remediate an environmental 
emergency over the locus State’s objection, some scholars argue that 
such an entry may not rise to the level of a threat or use of force.300 
Such an entry would then constitute only an intervention in the 
domestic affairs of the locus State, and, as such, could be justified as a 
proportionate response to the locus State’s interference in the domestic 
affairs of the target State caused by the environmental emergency.301 
For example, some scholars maintain that Article 2(4) of the UNC 
forbids only the threat or use of force undertaken specifically for the 
purpose of attacking “the territorial integrity or political independence 
of [the] . . . state.”302 To be sure, the plain language of Article 2(4) 
                                                                 
 296. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶ 123-125, 244-245. 
 297. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 238 (funding). 
 298. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶. 227-228, 238. 
 299. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 238. The ICJ’s opinion regarding the 
U.S.’ self-defense claim is further discussed below. See infra § II.C.2.i. 
 300. See, e.g., Michael Murphy, supra note 4, at 1215. 
 301. See Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶ 10, 210, 249. 
 302. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 4, at 1215. 
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suggests as much.303 If this is a correct interpretation of the scope of 
Article 2(4) (and the customary international prohibition against the 
use or threat of force), then a target State’s entry into the locus State 
arguably would not constitute a threat or use of force because that entry 
would not be for the specific purpose of attacking the locus State’s 
territorial integrity or political independence. Rather, the target State 
would be entering the locus State to investigate the environmental 
emergency and possibly remediate it.304 
However, most scholars today conclude that any threat or use of 
force against a State necessarily violates that state’s territorial integrity 
or political independence and therefore the reference to a State’s 
territorial integrity or political independence in UNC Article 2(4) does 
not serve to exclude any category of threats or uses of force.305 The 
ICJ’s opinion in The Corfu Channel case306 supports this view. In The 
Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ held that the British Navy’s 
minesweeping of the Corfu Channel, located in the territorial waters 
of Albania, violated the prohibition against force in Article 2(4) of the 
UNC,307 when Albania had specifically denied Britain permission to 
conduct that operation.308 Given that Britain had conducted the 
minesweeping operation for the purpose of ensuring safe passage to 
ships traveling through the channel, and not for the purpose of 
acquiring any Albanian territory or interfering with Albania’s political 
regime,309 the ICJ’s holding suggests that reference to “territorial 
integrity and political independence” in Article 2(4) essentially is mere 
surplusage that can safely be ignored.310 Therefore, a target State’s 
entry into the locus State might still be considered a threat or use of 
force even in the absence of interference with the territorial integrity 
or political independence of the locus State. 
                                                                 
 303. See text accompanying supra notes 261-264. 
 304. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 4, at 1215. 
 305. See, e.g., Murray Colin Alder, THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (Springer 2012) (citations omitted). 
 306. Corfu Channel Case, supra note 285. 
 307. Corfu Channel Case, supra note 285, at ¶¶ 34-35. 
 308. Corfu Channel Case, supra note 285, at ¶ 33. 
 309. Corfu Channel Case, supra note 285, at ¶¶ 34-35. 
 310. See, e.g., Müge Kinacioğlu, The Principle of Non-intervention at the United 
Nations: The Charter Framework and the Legal Debate, Perceptions, Summer 2005, 
15, at 22 (citing Corfu Channel Case, supra note 285, at ¶ 35), http://sam.gov.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Muge-Kinacioglu.pdf. 
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Moreover, entry into the locus State by a multilateral force or a 
target State would seem to necessarily carry at least the threat of force 
against the locus State in the event that the locus State resisted such 
entry. Certainly, entry into the locus State, without the locus State’s 
permission, would seem to “violate the existing international 
boundaries” of the locus State, which the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations lists as an example of a “threat or use of force.”311 Similarly, 
the occupation of the emergency site by a multilateral force or target 
State for the purpose of investigating the emergency and remediating 
it, if necessary, likewise may constitute a threat of force in the event 
that the locus State attempted to force the interloper to leave the 
emergency site. Accordingly, such an occupation of the emergency site 
could be described as a “military occupation resulting from the use of 
force,” another example of a “threat or use of force” provided in the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations.312 
Finally, the entry into a locus State without the locus State’s 
permission by a multilateral force or target State seems more akin to 
the U.S.’ laying of mines, attacks on Nicaragua’s ports, oil 
installations, and a naval base, and arming and training of the Contras, 
than to the U.S.’ funding of the Contras. The ICJ in The Nicaragua 
Case held that the former actions constituted threats or uses of force 
against Nicaragua, while the latter action constituted an intervention in 
the domestic affairs of Nicaragua. Thus, The Nicaragua Case likewise 
supports the conclusion that entry into the locus State without the locus 
State’s permission would constitute a threat or use of force. 
For all of these reasons, entry by a multilateral force or a target State 
into the locus State without the locus State’s permission most likely 
would constitute a threat or use of force against the locus State. The 
next section of this article addresses whether such a threat or use of 
force could be justified under current international law. 
C. The Entry into a Locus State of a U.N.-Backed Multilateral 
Force or a Target State Without the Locus State’s Permission Most 
Likely Would be Justified under the U.N. Charter 
There are two major exceptions to the prohibition against a threat or 
use of force against a sovereign state: a multilateral use of force 
                                                                 
 311. See text accompanying supra notes 270-272. 
 312. See text accompanying supra notes 270-272. 
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authorized by the U.N. Security Council under its UNC Chapter VII 
powers and a unilateral use of force exercised pursuant to the 
international principle of collective or self-defense codified in Article 
51 of the UNC.313 Specifically, in the case of a MIEE, the U.N. 
Security Council almost certainly could authorize a multilateral force 
to enter the locus State, even over the locus State’s objection, in order 
to investigate and then remediate a MIEE. Such an authorization would 
be legal so long as the U.N. Security Council followed the procedures 
for enforcement actions set forth in Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter. Second, a target State’s entry into a locus State, without the 
locus State’s permission, most likely could be justified under the 
international legal principle of self-defense. Each of these is discussed 
further below. 
1. Entry of a Multilateral Force 
The UNC negotiators granted the U.N. Security Council, in Chapter 
VII of the UNC, tremendous power to prevent and stop international 
conflicts.314 They did this by granting the Security Council unlimited 
discretion to determine whether any particular situation constitutes a 
breach of the peace, threat to the peace, or an act of aggression.315 
Whenever the Security Council answers that question in the 
affirmative, it has very broad discretion to decide whether to employ 
armed force or other measures in order to maintain or restore peace.316 
Specifically, Article 39 of the UNC provides that the Security Council: 
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression . . . and shall. . . . 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
                                                                 
 313. See, e.g., Desierto, supra note 261, at 285; Tams, supra note 267, at 360. 
 314. See, e.g., H. Karsten Schmidt, The Charter of the United Nations: An 
Instrument to Re-Establish International Peace and Security?, 33 IND. L. J. 322, 322-
23 (1958); Schott, supra note 260, at 38. 
 315. Id. 
 316. See GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN 
OPERATIONAL APPROACH 10-11 (Wolters Kluwer 2014); AREND & BECK, supra 
note 258, at 49. 
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Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.317 
In the event that the Security Council determines that a situation 
constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression, Article 41 then authorizes the Security Council to order 
U.N. members to take any measures not involving armed force to 
resolve the situation.318 Such measures could include “complete or 
partial interruption of economics relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations.”319 If such measures have proven to 
be inadequate or the Security Council believes that they would be 
inadequate, the Council then can authorize armed forces to maintain 
or restore order.320 The measures listed in both Article 41 and 42 are 
non-exhaustive.321 
During the UNC negotiations, the negotiators considered defining 
the terms “threat to peace,” “breach of peace,” and “act of aggression,” 
but they purposefully left these terms undefined in order to provide the 
Security Council with even greater discretion.322 In addition, they 
considered providing the U.N. General Assembly with veto power 
over the Security Council’s exercise of its Chapter VII powers, but 
they ultimately decided not to include such a check on the Security 
Council’s power.323 Similarly, they rejected the option of having the 
                                                                 
 317. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 318. U.N. Charter art. 41. 
 319. Id. 
 320. U.N. Charter art. 42. 
 321. Schott, supra note 260, at 52; CORN ET AL., supra note 316, at 10. 
 322. See, e.g., Alexandra Knight, Global Environmental Threats: Can the Security 
Council Protect Our Earth?, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1569, n.97 (citing David 
Schweigman, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF 
THE UN CHARTER: LEGAL LIMITS AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 34 (2001); Schmidt, supra note 314, at 322- 323; Schott, supra note 260, at 
36; Eric Rosand, The Security Council As “Global Legislator”: Ultra Vires or Ultra 
Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 542, 554, n.52 (2004). 
 323. See, e.g., Anna M. Vrandenburgh, The Chapter VII Powers of the United 
Nations Charter: Do They Trump Human Rights Law, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 175, 178 (1991); see also Schott, supra note 260, at 38 (“The U.N.’s other 
organs have little in the way of legally-ordained recourse in checking Council action 
under Article 39.”). 
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ICJ possess plenary power to review the Security Council’s Chapter 
VII resolutions.324 Without question, the negotiators did not want to 
hamper the Security Council’s ability to maintain international 
peace.325 
For several years following the establishment of the U.N. in 1945, 
the Security Council rarely exercised its Chapter VII powers, given the 
Cold War and the ability of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as permanent 
members of the Security Council to use their veto power to check each 
other.326 Following the end of the Cold War, however, the Security 
Council has utilized its Chapter VII powers extensively.327 For 
example, “[i]n the first forty-four years of the Council’s existence, 
‘[twenty-four] Security Council resolutions cited or used the terms of 
Chapter VII; by 1992 it was adopting that many such resolutions every 
year.’ In 2005, this number rose to thirty-nine. In 2006, no fewer than 
forty-two Council resolutions cited Chapter VII.”328 
To date, the Security Council has only very rarely declared a 
situation to constitute an “act of aggression”329 or a “breach of the 
                                                                 
 324. BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: COLLECTIVELY DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN THE 
AMERICAS 38 (Tom Farer, ed. The John Hopkins U. Press 1996); Schott, supra note 
260, at 39, n.97, 63-64. 
 325. See, e.g., Linda Malone, Discussion in the Security Council on Environmental 
Intervention in the Ukraine, 27 LOYOLA OF L.A. L. REV. 893, 904 (1994) [hereinafter 
Malone, Discussion]; Vrandenburgh, supra note 323, at 178. 
 326. AREND & BECK, supra note 258, at 52; Joy Gordon, The United Nations 
Security Council and the Emerging Crisis of Legitimacy, 9 YALE J. INT’L AFF. 40, 
40 (2014). 
 327. See, e.g., David Bosco, Assessing the UN Security Council: A Concert 
Perspective, 20 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 545, 545-546 (2014); David Malone, 
DECISION-MAKING IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: THE CASE OF HAITI, 1990-
1997, 7-36 (Clarendon Press 1998) [hereinafter David Malone]. 
 328. Schott, supra note 260, at 46. 
 329. See, e.g., AREND & BECK, supra note 258, at 48; Simon Chesterman, JUST 
WAR OR JUST PEACE? 114 (Oxford U. Press 2003) (citing the armed attacks and other 
hostilities committed by Israel against the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 
Tunisia in 1985 and 1988; the armed invasion and other hostilities committed by 
South Africa against Angola in 1976 and 1985 and against Botswana in 1985; and 
the armed invasion and other hostile acts committed by the illegal minority regime 
in Southern Rhodesia against the Republic of Zambia in 1979). 
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peace.”330 Accordingly, whenever the Security Council has ordered 
that measures be taken pursuant to Article 41 or 42, it has almost 
always first declared that the situation in question constituted a “threat 
to peace.”331 
The Security Council may prefer not to describe an aggressor State’s 
act as a “breach of the peace” or an “act of aggression,” because doing 
so could then make it difficult for the Council to act as an impartial 
arbiter in the dispute.332 It is also possible that the Security Council 
encourages States to aggressively report threats to peace because 
threats to peace are easier to resolve than breaches of the peace or acts 
of aggression, and accordingly the Security Council declares many 
more threats to peace than acts of aggression or breaches of the 
peace.333 
                                                                 
 330. Chesterman, supra note 329, at 114 (citing North Korea’s armed attack on 
South Korea in 1950; Argentina’s armed invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982; 
and the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq in 1987). 
 331. See, e.g., James Sloan, The Peacekeeping Powers of the Security Council and 
the Limitations Thereupon, in THE MILITARISATION OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, § 3.2.1 (Powers under Art. 39) (Hart Publishing 2011) 
(“Among the three triggering events, threats to the peace have been found to exist by 
the Security Council far more frequently than breaches of the peace or acts of 
aggression. . . .”); See also REPERTOIRE: OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL, Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and 
Acts of Aggression (Chapter VII), http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2017) (complete description of each of the Security Council’s 
Chapter VII resolutions). 
 332. Sloan, supra note 331, at § 3.2.1 (stating that the Security Council tends to 
declare only a threat to the peace “even in situations which many would regard as 
being more in the nature of ‘aggression’”); see also Jack Burke, Germany as a 
Permanent U.N. Security Council Member, FORDHAM POLITICAL REV. (Apr. 23, 
2016), http://fordhampoliticalreview.org/germany-as-a-permanent-u-n-security-
council-member/ [https://perma.cc/CFU5-8FK6] (“The U.N. . . . was chartered in 
1945 as a neutral arbiter and guarantor of world peace.”). 
 333. See, e.g., Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Conflict Prevention Must Be 
“Cornerstone Of Collective Security In 21st Century, Secretary-General Tells 
Members, As Council Discusses Armed Conflict, SC/6892, July 20, 2000,  
https://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000720.sc6892.doc.html [https://perma.cc/
RSZ2-8L5P] (U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan advocating the international 
community to focus on early intervention and conflict prevention rather than post-
conflict resolution); 2005 World Outcome Document, ¶ 138 (stating that the 
international community’s responsibility to protect will be enhanced through 
development of a better “early warning capacity”); L. Feinstein, Darfur and Beyond: 
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On the other hand, it may simply be easier for the Council to justify 
a finding of “threat to peace,”334 because a “breach of the peace” has 
come to be defined as “hostilities between armed units.”335 The 
General Assembly, in a resolution, defined an “act of aggression” as 
“the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the charter of the United Nations[,]”336 
whereas a “threat to peace” remains undefined337other than in a 
circular manner.338 In 1974, Jean Combacau emphasized: “A threat to 
the peace in the sense of art 39 is a situation that the organ, competent 
to impose sanctions [the Security Council], declares to be an actual 
threat to the peace.”339 While the General Assembly’s definition of an 
“act of aggression” is not binding on the Security Council,340 the 
Security Council, in rendering a determination under Chapter 39 that 
a State’s action constituted an “act of aggression,” most likely would 
feel obligated to justify any departure from the General Assembly’s 
definition of the same, as the General Council had developed that 
definition to assist the Security Council in making its Article 39 
determinations.341 
Finally, the U.N. General Assembly in 2005 affirmed the Security 
Council’s power under Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UNC to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity (even if committed by their own 
                                                                 
What is Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 17 
(2007) (stating that diplomatic methods are more effective than military methods, as 
the former are “easier to initiate and sustain”). 
 334. See, e.g., Sloan, supra note 331, at § 3.2.1 (“While the Charter does not define 
‘threat to peace’, ‘breach of the peace’, or ‘act of aggression’, the wording makes it 
clear that ‘threat to the peace’ has the lowest threshold, requiring the least 
forcefulness.”). 
 335. Schott, supra note 260, at 36 (citing THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: 
A COMMENTARY 721 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter THE 
COMMENTARY]). 
 336. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXII), Annex arts, 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 337. See, e.g., Schott, supra note 260, at 36. 
 338. See, e.g., Chesterman, supra note 329, at 127 (citing Jean Combacau, LE 
POUVOIR DE SANCTION DE ‘ONU: TUDE THÉORIQUE DE LA COERCITION NO 
MILITAIRE 100 (Editions A Pedone 1974)). 
 339. See Chesterman, supra note 329, at 127. 
 340. THE COMMENTARY, supra note 335, at 722. 
 341. THE COMMENTARY, supra note 335, at pmbl. 
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governments).342 This power is commonly referred to as the Security 
Council’s “responsibility to protect” or “R2P.”343 Although the 
General Assembly established no new law in its R2P resolution,344 
many of the Security Council’s Chapter VII findings of a “threat to 
peace” in recent years have been founded on its responsibility to 
protect populations from the four atrocities listed in the R2P 
resolution.345 
In any case, in the last two decades, the situations determined by the 
Security Council to constitute a “threat to the peace” have been 
voluminous,346 wide-ranging,347 and often involve situations that 
States in prior years would have considered to be domestic affairs.348 
For example, they have included “terrorism, humanitarian intervention 
                                                                 
 342. G.A. Res. A/RES/60/1, ¶ 138 (Sept. 16, 2005). The Security Council 
reaffirmed this power in 2006. S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4 (Apr. 28, 2006). 
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 347. See, e.g., Chesterman, supra note 329, at 128 (“Chapter VII has been invoked 
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 348. See, e.g., Kawser Ahmed, The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the United 
Nations Charter: A Historical View, 10 SYBIL 175, 176 (2006), 
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and relief, certification schemes for diamonds to ensure that they do 
not originate from conflict areas, children and armed conflict, 
conditions in refugee camps, women and girls and armed conflict, the 
social causes of armed conflict, the extradition of two terrorists thought 
responsible for the Lockerbie bombing, and the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.349 
Some States and commentators in recent years have criticized the 
now-activist Security Council for issuing so many findings of a “threat 
to the peace” under UNC Article 39.350 In particular, they have urged 
the Security Council to employ its R2P powers only when one of the 
stated atrocities clearly has occurred or is occurring.351 In light of this 
criticism, U.N. officials have explicitly stated that the Security Council 
should not utilize its R2P power to authorize U.N. troops to enter a 
State in order to protect that State’s people from an environmental 
emergency, so long as that emergency is not threatening harm to any 
other State. 352 
However, an environmental emergency that threatens to harm one 
or more other States is a very different matter. Scholars 
                                                                 
 349. Knight, supra note 322, at 1565-1566. 
 350. See, e.g., THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE 
EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 90 (Oxford U. Press 2010); 
LORAINE SIEVERS & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 
389 (Oxford U. Press, 4th ed. 2014) (“Concerns have been voiced from a significant 
number of UN Member States that Chapter VII is being invoked too often to impose 
mandatory obligations on Member States and to take binding decisions on matters 
outside the traditional functions of the Council.”). 
 351. See, e.g., Thomas G. Weiss, Whither R2P?, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES IN LIGHT OF THE LIBYAN INTERVENTION, 
E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 8 (2011), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/181082/
R2P.pdf (“In short, the responsibility to protect is not about the protection of 
everyone from everything. Broadening [of] perspectives has opened the floodgates 
to an overflow of appeals to address too many problems. . . . It is emotionally 
tempting to say that we have a responsibility to protect people from HIV/AIDS and 
small arms, and the Inuit from global warming, However, if R2P means everything, 
it means nothing.”); Qu Xing, THE UN CHARTER, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
AND THE SYRIA ISSUE, CHINA INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, CHINA INST. 
OF INT’L STUDIES (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2012-04/16/
content_4943041.htm [https://perma.cc/J4KE-5AY9] (“To sum up, . . . the 
‘responsibility to protect’ concept is apt to be abused due to its blurred and extensive 
definition and the arbitrariness of its application.”). 
 352. Malone, Green Helmets, supra note 4, at 24. 
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overwhelmingly agree that the Security Council would possess the 
power to declare such an emergency a “threat to the peace” under 
Article 39 and authorize a U.N. force to enter the locus State over its 
objection in order to investigate and possibly remediate such an 
emergency.353 To begin, the fact that environmental damage threatens 
peace and security is widely acknowledged.  This concept of 
“environmental security” was first popularized in the 1987 report 
entitled Our Common Future.354 Numerous U.S. agencies, including 
the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the National 
Security Agency, have since cited environmental degradation as a 
national security issue.355 Numerous U.N. agencies and other 
international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the International Criminal Police 
Organization (ICPO or Interpol) have similarly linked environmental 
quality with security.356 In 1992, the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, in Principle 25, declared: “peace, development and 
                                                                 
 353. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 322, at 1572; Lorraine Elliott, Expanding the 
Mandate of the UN Security Council to Account for Environmental Issues, U.N. U. 
INST. OF ADV. STUDIES PROJECT ON INT’L ENVTL. GOV. REFORM 15-17 (February 
2002), http://archive.unu.edu/inter-linkages/docs/IEG/Elliot.pdf; Murphy, supra 
note 4, at 1184; Linda Malone, Green Helmets: A Conceptual Framework for 
Security Council Authority in Environmental Emergencies, 17 MICH. J. INT’L LAW 
515, 523 (1996) [hereinafter Malone, Conceptual Framework]. 
 354. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 353; Maria Julia Trombetta, Environmental 
Security and Climate Change: Analyzing the Discourse, 21:4 CAMBRIDGE REV. 
INT’L AFFAIRS 585 (2009), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/
09557570802452920. This report was published by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development and is commonly referred to as the Brundtland 
Report in honor of Gro Helm Brundtland, the first female prime minister of Norway 
who chaired the Commission. Trombetta, supra note 354; The Brundtland 
Commission Report, Our Common Future, THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVT. AND 
DEV. (1987), https://www.slideshare.net/prithivim1/our-common-future-the-
brundtland-commission-report [https://perma.cc/YS3K-G44U]. 
 355. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 322, at 1552 (citations omitted); see also Elliott, 
supra note 353, at 10-11. 
 356. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 322, at 1552; STRATEGIC REPORT: 
ENVIRONMENT, PEACE AND SECURITY A CONVERGENCE OF THREATS, INTERPOL & 
UNEP, Dec. 2016, at preface (“Abuse of the environment is the fourth largest 
criminal activity in the world. . . . It is, therefore, a growing threat to peace, security 
and stability.”). 
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environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible[,]”357 and 
that same year the U.N. Security Council stated: 
The absence of war and military conflicts amongst states 
does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The 
non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, 
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to 
peace and security.358  
Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan “urged the Security Council 
to expand its agenda to include what he call[ed] the ‘soft threats’ of 
environmental change and degradation[.]”359 The High Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Changes established by Kofi Annan 
recommended specific changes to the Security Council’s jurisdiction 
to better allow it to respond to such threats.360 Numerous other 
commentators agree that protection of the environment is a security 
issue.361 This concept can hardly be doubted in light of the fact that in 
1995 the Nigerian Government executed nine environmental activists, 
including the well-known playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa, following 
disputes with Royal/Dutch Shell over whether it had failed to follow 
environmental safeguards in Nigeria, thereby destroying numerous 
communities, farms, and fisheries.362 In total, the U.N. estimated that 
                                                                 
 357. Rio Declaration, supra note 251. 
 358. President of the Security Council, Note by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc S/23500 at 3 (Jan. 31, 1992). 
 359. Knight, supra note 322, at 1551 (citing Kofi Annan, The Secretary-General 
Address to the General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2003), http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/
58/statements/sg2eng030923.htm). 
 360. Knight, supra note 322, (citing UNITED NATIONS, A MORE SECURE WORLD: 
ONE SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, 
CHALLENGES, AND CHANGE, U.N. G.A. 59th Sess., U.N. Doc, A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 
2004)). 
 361. See, e.g., Catherine Tinker, Environmental Security: Finding the Balance, in 
ADAPTING THE UNITED NATIONS TO A POST-MODERN ERA: LESSONS LEARNED 204 
(W. Andy Knight, ed. Springer 2001). 
 362. See, e.g., Malone, Conceptual Framework, supra note 353, at 528-29 (citing 
Stephen Buckley, Nigeria Hangs Playwright, Eight Activists, Wash. Post, Nov, 11, 
1995, at A1, A26). 
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approximately 300 conflicts over water usage erupted around the 
world in 2011.363 
Furthermore, while the Security Council has not yet issued a Chapter 
VII resolution authorizing a multilateral force to enter a locus State to 
investigate or remediate a MIEE, it has issued numerous Chapter VII 
resolutions related to issues of environmental degradation. For 
example, in 1991, in a Chapter VII resolution, it found that Iraqi forces 
under the direction of Saddam Hussein had violated international law 
when they burned Kuwaiti oil wells, resulting in “environmental 
damage and the depletion of natural resources.”364 In 2001, it 
condemned the exploitation of diamonds and other natural resources 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo “to finance the conflict in 
that country.”365 Similarly, the Security Council’s Chapter VII 
resolutions regarding conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Nigeria, and 
Liberia found that these conflicts stemmed in part from environmental 
degradation issues.366 
Scholars agree that a Security Council resolution authorizing a U.N. 
force to enter a locus State over its objection to investigate and 
possibly remediate a MIEE (major international environmental 
emergency) would be lawful.367 This is so because there is an 
acknowledged connection between environmental degradation and 
security.368 The Security Council has issued resolutions founded on 
environmental degradation.369 Moreover, the UNC negotiators clearly 
intended for the Security Council to take an activist role in maintaining 
and restoring peace,370 by granting the Council essentially limitless 
power to determine when a situation constitutes a “threat to the 
                                                                 
 363. Munizzaman, supra note 2. 
 364. Knight, supra note 322, at 1566 (quoting S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991)). 
 365. Knight, supra note 322 (quoting S.C. Res. 1376, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1376 
(Nov. 9. 2001)). 
 366. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 353 (discussing situations in Somalia, Rwanda, 
Liberia, and Haiti); Munizzaman, supra note 2 (discussing situations in Rwanda and 
Nigeria). 
 367. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 322, at 1572; Elliott, supra note 353, at 15-17; 
Murphy, supra note 4, at 1184; Malone, Conceptual Framework, supra note 353, at 
523. 
 368. See text accompanying supra notes 353-363. 
 369. See text accompanying supra notes 364-366. 
 370. See text accompanying supra notes 330-333. 
286 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIX 
 
peace.”371 Finally, the Council has, in fact, found numerous, varied 
situations to constitute “threats to the peace” in recent years.372 
At the same time, even if an emergency threatened to kill millions 
of people in a number of other States, the target States could not be 
certain that the Security Council would authorize a U.N. force to enter 
the locus State, because one or more of the five permanent members 
of the Security Council could always veto such a resolution.373 
Furthermore, a permanent member of the Security Council would be 
especially likely to exercise its veto power if the emergency were 
occurring in its own territory.374 A permanent member’s vote to 
insulate itself from a U.N. enforcement action in the face of an 
environmental emergency in its territory would be inappropriate, given 
that environmental emergencies don’t respect international borders 
and the target States may not be able to protect their populations 
against the harm emanating from the locus State. This is particularly 
the case, given that other U.N. members could not prevent a U.N.-
backed force from entering their territories in the event of an 
environmental emergency occurring there. Yet, there is nothing in the 
UNC that would prevent a permanent member of the Security Council 
from utilizing its veto power in such a case.375 
Especially given that a target State cannot rely on the U.N. for 
assistance when facing severe harm from an environmental emergency 
in a locus State, that target State may enter the locus State or enlist the 
assistance of one or more other States to enter the locus State over the 
locus State’s objection in order to investigate and possibly remediate 
                                                                 
 371. See text accompanying supra notes 330-333. It should be remembered that 
whatever degree of “imminence” is required for a target State to enter a locus State 
in self-defense is not required for the Security Council to act. See, e.g., Domikia 
Švarc, Redefining Imminence: The Use of Force against Threats and Armed Attacks 
in the Twenty-First Century, 13:1 ILSA J. OF INTERNAL & COMPARATIVE L. 171, 176 
(2006). 
 372. See text accompanying supra notes 346-349. 
 373. U.N. Charter art. 27(2), 27(3) (Decisions of the Security Council on 
procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. Decisions 
of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of 
nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members[.]). 
 374. See, e.g., Malone, Discussion, supra note 325, at 906-907. 
 375. U.N. charter art. 27. 
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the emergency.376 The next subsection of this article considers the 
legality of such an entry into the locus State. 
2. Unilateral Intervention Pursuant to the Principle of Self-Defense 
First, the customary international law principle of self-defense and 
the right to self-defense contained in Article 51 of the UNC are 
discussed. Then, recent developments in the law of self-defense are 
discussed. Finally, the law of self-defense is applied to answer the 
question of whether a target State’s entry into a locus State without the 
locus State’s permission in order to remediate a MIEE could be 
justified under the principle of self-defense. 
i. Customary International Law Principle of Self-Defense 
For hundreds of years, the international community has recognized 
that each State has the right to use force to defend its nationals, land, 
resources, or political independence; this principle is considered to be 
jus cogens.377 
The criteria for use of force in self-defense were documented in 
correspondence between U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster and 
Lord Ashburton of Britain following an incident involving the U.S. 
ship Caroline in 1837 (hereinafter the “Caroline” and the “Caroline 
Incident”).378 These criteria are “necessity” and “proportionality.”379 
More specifically, Webster stated that the threat requiring the use of 
                                                                 
 376. The possibility of a State taking action in collective or self-defense is one of 
the main reasons that the U.N., through the Security Council, was granted the power 
to take action under Chapter VII of the UNC. Elliott, supra note 353, at 15 (“The 
grounds for a mandate for the Security Council to act in such cases have been 
assumed to rely on states’ individual or collective right of self-defence. . . .”). 
 377. Murphy, supra note 4, at 1204-1206; Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in 
International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L LAW 291, 202 (2006). The British referred to 
this as an “inherent” right, the French referred to this as a “natural” right, and the 
Soviets referred to this as an “imprescriptible” right. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 
4, at 1205 (citing WILLIAM V. O’BRIEN, LAW AND MORALITY IN ISRAEL’S WAR 
WITH THE PLO, 286 (Routledge 1991); see also Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at 
¶ 176 (referring to this right as a “natural” or “inherent” right). 
 378. Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842) (quoted in 2 
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906)). 
 379. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 4, at 1208 (citing Robert Y. Jennings, The 
Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1938)); Nicaragua Case, 
supra note 265 at ¶ 194. 
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force in self-defense must be “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no 
choice of means and no moment for deliberation” (necessity) and the 
use of force itself cannot be anything unreasonable or excessive[.] . . . 
[T]he act justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by 
the necessity and kept clearly within it” (proportionality).380 
In 1837, when the Caroline Incident took place, Canada was a 
British territory.381 U.S. sympathizers with a Canadian rebel 
movement had used the U.S. ship Caroline on a few occasions to 
transport arms and supplies to the rebel movement in Canada, and then 
the Canadian rebels had used those arms to attack British troops and 
Canadian loyalists within the territory of Canada.382 These U.S. 
sympathizers were not members of the U.S. military or in any way 
associated with the U.S. Government.383 On the evening of December 
20, 1837, the Caroline was docked at the port of Schlosser, New York, 
approximately three miles above Niagara Falls.384 In order to stop 
further arms shipments to the rebels and further rebel attacks on 
Canadian soil, British troops illegally crossed into the U.S., attacked 
the mean onboard the Caroline, set the Caroline on fire, and sent the 
ship over Niagara Falls.385 During this event, at least one of the U.S. 
                                                                 
 380. Murphy, supra note 4, at 1208 (internal citation omitted). Significantly, these 
criteria essentially are the same as the criteria for a claim of self-defense in criminal 
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D.C., Spring 2012 (on file with author). 
 383. See Miller, supra note 382. 
 384. See Miller, supra note 382. 
 385. See Miller, supra note 382. 
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sympathizers was killed and several were wounded, and there was a 
loud protest in the U.S. regarding these U.S. casualties.386 
In order to resolve the dispute between the U.S. and Canada, 
Webster and Ashburton engaged in the communication referred to 
above.387 Ultimately, in these communications, each government 
apologized to the other. Secretary Webster apologized that the U.S. 
hadn’t been able to prevent the U.S. sympathizers from assisting the 
Canadian rebels. He also stated that employment of force might be 
justified in such a situation, but he maintained that, in the present case, 
there had been no “necessity” for Britain to use the force against the 
Caroline and its inhabitants that it had.388 On behalf of Britain, Lord 
Ashburton apologized for Britain’s entry into U.S. territory without the 
U.S.’ permission and attack on the Caroline, but then he maintained 
that Britain had had no choice but to conduct this operation389 because 
the U.S. had been unwilling or unable to control its nationals who were 
supporting the Canadian rebels.390 
Again, the only two criteria for a state’s use of force in self-defense 
which Webster and Ashburton explicitly mentioned in their 
correspondence are “necessity” and “proportionality.”391 In particular, 
they did not require that a victim State must first suffer an “armed 
attack” at the hands of a perpetrator State before the victim State can 
use force in self-defense (although the U.S. sympathizers certainly had 
violated Canada’s territorial integrity and political independence and 
wished to harm Britain).392 In fact, Webster and Ashburton indicated 
that, so long as the criteria of “necessity” and “proportionality” are 
met, a State can use force in response to an imminent, rather than an 
actual, attack.393 Furthermore, they indicated that a State can even use 
force in self-defense in response to threats made by a non-state actor 
if the state harboring the non-state actor is unwilling or unable to 
control that actor’s behavior.394 Finally, although Secretary Daniel 
                                                                 
 386. See Miller, supra note 382. 
 387. See Miller, supra note 382. 
 388. See Miller, supra note 382. 
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Webster refused to concede the point in his communications with Lord 
Ashburton,395 the international community has generally agreed that 
the two criteria of “necessity” and “proportionality” were met in the 
Caroline Incident and thus Britain’s actions were justified.396 
ii. Adoption of Article 51 of the UNC 
As stated above, in 1945, following the conclusion of World War II, 
the negotiators of the UNC, incorporated the general prohibition 
against any threat or use of force by any State in Article 2(4).397 During 
the UNC negotiations, the U.S. had argued that the customary 
international law principle of self-defense was so well-established that 
it need not be stated in the UNC.398 In addition, several previous 
multilateral treaties, such as the Covenant of the League of Nations399 
and the Kellogg-Briand Pact,400 had not referred to the principle, yet 
many of the signatories to those treaties had clarified in separate, 
contemporaneous writings that the treaty did not abrogate the 
customary international law principle of self-defense.401 Just prior to 
1945, however, several State representatives negotiating the UNC had 
entered into mutual defense treaties and wanted to ensure that these 
defense pacts would still be considered legal under the UNC.402 For 
this reason, the negotiators agreed to include a specific reference to the 
self-defense principle in Article 51 of the UNC.403 
Article 51 reads as follows: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to main 
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international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not 
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.404  
The term “armed attack” is not defined in the UNC.405 While we 
know why the negotiators included Article 51 in the UNC, it is not 
completely clear why they agreed to include the language, “if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” in Article 51, 
other than a desire to limit the right of self-defense.406 This is 
especially the case, given that neither the customary international law 
principle of self-defense nor the concept of self-defense in domestic 
criminal law traditionally had been explicitly conditioned on the 
occurrence of an “armed attack.”407 Some have suggested that the 
UNC negotiators added this phrase in order to include an objectively 
verifiable condition to a state’s claimed right to use force in self-
defense, “[because] Germany had entered Poland on the pretext that 
Poland had attacked her.” 408 The negotiators’ desire to discourage 
States’ use of force based on false claims of self-defense is 
understandable. However, the inclusion of the “armed attack” 
language in Article 51 was immediately controversial. 
Following adoption of the UNC, a lively debate ensued regarding 
the significance of the “armed attack” requirement contained in Article 
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51. Some writers (generally referred to as “restrictionists”) focused on 
the “armed attack” requirement in Article 51 and argued that Article 
51 had completely supplanted the customary international law 
principle of self-defense.409 Others (generally referred to as “counter-
restrictionists”) focused instead on Article 51’s reference to the 
“inherent right of individual or collective self-defense,” and tended to 
argue that while Article 51 might condition the use of force in self-
defense on an “armed attack,” a State still could use force in self-
defense in the absence of an armed attack under the customary 
international law principle of self-defense.410 
Neither argument was logical. The restrictionists’ argument was 
illogical because Article 51 explicitly stated that nothing in the UNC 
(including Article 51) abrogated the customary international law 
principle of self-defense.411 On the other hand, the counter-
restrictionists’ argument was illogical because the plain language of 
Article 51 indicates (even if incorrectly) that an “armed attack” is a 
condition to the use of force in self-defense under customary 
international law.412 Furthermore, the maintenance of two competing 
criteria for use of force in self-defense is illogical. The issues of exactly 
how the customary international principle of self-defense fit together 
with UNC Article 51, whether an armed attack was required for use of 
force in self-defense in all situations, and the parameters of any such 
required “armed attack” were unclear for decades. 
iii. International Court of Justice Decision in Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
The Nicaragua Case,413 discussed above,414 addressed many of the 
open issues relevant to the right to use of force in self-defense under 
Article 51 and the customary international law principle of self-
defense. With regard to the U.S.’ claim that its actions were justified 
under the principle of collective defense, the ICJ considered only the 
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customary international principle of collective defense, given the U.S.’ 
multilateral treaty reservation to the ICJ Statute.415 The specific actions 
that the U.S. claimed justified its own actions against Nicaragua were 
Nicaragua’s alleged provision of arms to the organized opposition in 
El Salvador, its military incursions into Costa Rica, and its military 
incursions into Honduras.416 In applying the customary international 
principle of collective/self-defense to the U.S.’ actions, the ICJ first 
clarified that, when the UNC negotiators referred to the customary 
international principle of collective/self-defense in Article 51 of the 
UNC, that principle continued to exist after the UNC went into effect. 
The ICJ specifically emphasized that the language of Article 51 – 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective defense” - would be nonsensical otherwise.417 
It then noted that the content of the customary international law 
principle of self-defense and the content of Article 51 are not 
identical.418 For example, the ICJ noted that Article 51 did not 
reference the criteria of “necessity” and “proportionality” contained in 
the customary international law principle of self-defense.419 
On the other hand, the ICJ assumed (without providing any evidence 
in support of its assumption) that when the UNC was adopted in 1945, 
that the customary international law right of self-defense was 
conditioned on the occurrence of an “armed attack.”420 At the same 
time, it noted that, since Article 51 does not define the term “armed 
attack,” customary international law would govern the meaning of 
“armed attack,” which could, of course, evolve over time.421 The ICJ 
                                                                 
 415. See § II.C.2.iv. 
 416. See § II.C.2.iv. 
 417. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 176. 
 418. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 176. 
 419. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 176. 
 420. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶ 195, 211. A number of authors have 
pointed out that the customary international principle of self-defense, at least 
originally, did not condition the use of force in self-defense upon the occurrence of 
an armed attack. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 4, at 1201, n.88. 
 421. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 176. This essentially was the 
interpretation of how Article 51 of the UNC and the customary international law 
principle of self-defense worked together which Thomas Franck, the Murray and Ida 
Becker Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, had offered. See, 
e.g., FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 406, at 3-50 (Cambridge U. Press. 
2002) (summarizing his earlier statements). 
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went on to state that not every use of force by one State against a 
second State constitutes an “armed attack.”422 Only a use of force of 
sufficient “scale and effects” constitutes an “armed attack.”423 For 
example, the ICJ noted, a “minor border incident” is not an “armed 
attack.”424 
In this case, the U.S. did not claim that any of its actions were 
intended to repel or minimize an imminent armed attack.425 Therefore, 
the ICJ did not have an opportunity to express any view regarding 
whether, pursuant to UNC Article 51 or the customary international 
law principle of self-defense, an “armed attack” could include an 
“imminent armed attack.”426 
The ICJ addressed the circumstances under which the acts of a non-
State actor can be attributed to a State in The Nicaragua Case.427 
Specifically, it stated that such acts can be attributed to the State 
harboring the non-State actor only when the State had “effective 
control” over the non-State actor.428 This issue was relevant in the 
Nicaragua case because the Nicaragua had claimed that the U.S. was 
responsible for various atrocities allegedly committed by the Contras, 
and, on this point, the ICJ held that such atrocities could not be imputed 
to the U.S. because Nicaragua had not proven that the U.S. had 
“effective control” over the Contras.429 
Finally, the ICJ held that, even if Nicaragua’s actions had constituted 
arms attacks (and they had not), the U.S.’ actions still could not be 
justified under the customary international principle of collective/self-
defense because those actions had not met either of the two criteria of 
                                                                 
 422. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶ 191, 195, 210. 
 423. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 195. 
 424. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 195. This since has been referred to as 
the “scale and effects” test (see, e.g., KARL ZEMANEK, Armed Attack, MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 7 (Oct. 2013) (citing several authors), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199
231690-e241[https://perma.cc/7M8R-9NQM]), and many commentators have 
criticized the ICJ for establishing this test in The Nicaragua Case without providing 
any guidance as to how a “minor border incident” should be distinguished from an 
“armed attack.” ZEMANEK, supra note 424, at ¶¶ 7-8. 
 425. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 194. 
 426. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 194. 
 427. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 115. 
 428. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 115. 
 429. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 116. 
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“necessity” and “proportionality” required by that principle.430 
Specifically, the ICJ found that the U.S. had not proven that the 
Government of Nicaragua itself had provided arms to the rebels in El 
Salvador, at least since the early months of 1981.431 Furthermore, 
Nicaragua’s attacks in Costa Rica and Honduras were mere 
“incursions”432 and El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras had not 
requested the U.S.’ assistance in response to what they considered to 
be “armed attacks” by Nicaragua.433 For these reasons, none of 
Nicaragua’s alleged actions constituted an “armed attack.” 434 
Furthermore, even if at least one of Nicaragua’s alleged actions had 
constituted an armed attack, the ICJ explained that the U.S.’ actions 
had not been “necessary” because the armed opposition in El Salvador 
had already failed by January 1981, long before the U.S.’ actions.435 
Furthermore, the ICJ concluded, the U.S.’ laying of mines in 
Nicaragua’s ports and its attacks on Nicaragua’s ports, oil installations, 
and a naval base had not been “proportional” to Nicaragua’s alleged 
actions against El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras, even assuming 
those allegations to be true.436 
Following The Nicaragua Case, a number of commentators argued 
that the ICJ’s assumption that the customary international law 
principle of self-defense conditioned the use of force on the occurrence 
of an armed attack was unsupported by any evidence and incorrect.437 
In general, though, over time the international community has come to 
accept that, even under the customary international law principle of 
collective/self-defense, a State’s use of force must be conditioned on 
                                                                 
 430. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 237. 
 431. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 160. 
 432. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶ 164, 237. 
 433. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶¶ 232-233. 
 434. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 237. The ICJ did note that two examples 
of an “armed attack” are a State’s use of its own military forces against another State 
and a State’s use of non-regular or paramilitary forces against another State. 
Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 195. 
 435. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 237. 
 436. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 237. 
 437. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 4, at 1206 (stating that “[a]n interpretation of 
Article 51 that restricts the right to self-defense only to situations following an armed 
attack must be invalid”); see also JAMES A. GREEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE AND SELF DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 210 (Bloomsbury Pub. 2009). 
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the occurrence of an armed attack.438 The international community has 
instead concentrated on the meaning of an “armed attack” in a wide 
variety of settings.439 
iv. Developments Following The Nicaragua Case 
In the three decades since The Nicaragua Case, the law regarding 
the use of force in self-defense has evolved in several respects. This 
subsection discusses those developments. 
a. No Particular Weapon is Needed for an “Armed Attack”; 
Widespread Damage to Humans or Property is Key. 
Since The Nicaragua Case, the ICJ and international community in 
general have clarified that the “scale and effects” test for 
distinguishing between a minor border incident and an armed attack 
first announced by the ICJ in The Nicaragua Case is actually an 
effects-only test.440 More specifically, the particular “weapon” used is 
irrelevant441 and can be as small in “scale” as the release of an invisible 
biological or chemical toxin442 and still be considered an armed attack, 
                                                                 
 438. See, e.g., TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN 
CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS in CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 10 (Cambridge U. Press 
2010) (stating that “in 1966, the International Law Commission observed that ‘the 
great majority of international lawyers today unhesitatingly hold that Article 2, 
paragraph 4, together with other provisions of the Charter, authoritatively declares 
the modern customary law regarding the threat or use of force’”). 
 439. For example, in recent years, many scholars have debated whether imminent 
armed attacks, attacks by non-state actors such as Al Qaeda in the case of the 9/11 
attacks, and cyberattacks are “armed attacks.” See, e.g., Leo Van Den Hole, 
Anticipatory Self-Defence under International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 69 
(2003); Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for 
Extraterritorial Self-Defence, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012); T.H.E. Rolsasen, When 
Do Cyber Operations Amount to Use of Force and Armed Attack, and What 
Response Will They Justify?, Ph.D. dissertation submission, U. OF OSLO FACULTY 
OF L. (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/50840/
723.pdf?sequence=1. 
 440. See. e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 39-40 (July 8) (stating “[t]hese provisions do not refer 
to specific weapons. They apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons 
employed[.]”) [hereinafter I.C.J. Advisory Opinion]. 
 441. I.C.J. Advisory Opinion, supra note 440, at 226 ¶¶ 39-40. 
 442. See, e.g., ZEMANEK, supra note 424, at ¶ 11 (citing Ian Brownlie, The Use of 
Force in Self-Defence, 27 BYIL 183, 255-256 (1961). 
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so long as use of the “weapon” is capable of causing “considerable loss 
of life and/or extensive destruction of property[.]”443 
b. Attribution of Actions of a Non-State Actor to a State 
As discussed above, the ICJ, in The Nicaragua Case, adopted an 
“effective control” test for determining whether the actions of a non-
State actor are attributable to a State,444 and the ICJ subsequently 
affirmed this test.445 Since The Nicaragua Case, however, the 
international community, including the U.N. Security Council 
regarding the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda,446 through both its statements 
(opinio juris) and its practices, has largely embraced the principle that 
the actions of a non-State actor are attributable to a State if that State 
is “unwilling or unable” to control that non-State actor’s actions.447 
The “unwilling or unable” test for imputing to a State a non-State 
actor’s behavior actually has a very long history.448 For centuries, 
States have relied on this principle, in part, to justify rescues of their 
                                                                 
 443. ZEMANEK, supra note 424, at ¶ 21. 
 444. Nicaragua Case, supra note 265, at ¶ 115. 
 445. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. and Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 43 ¶¶ 399-
403 (July 11) (rejecting the “overall control” test espoused by the Appeals Chamber 
in the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in the Tadiq case (Prosecutor 
v. Tadić. Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995))). 
 446. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2011) (recognizing the 
U.S.’ right to use force in self-defense in response to the 9/11 attacks by non-state 
actors). 
 447. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 275 
(Cambridge U. Press 2011); Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-
Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L L.839, 840 (2001); Sean Murphy, Terrorism and the 
Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the UN Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L. J. 
41, 50 (2002); Paulina Starski, Right to Self-Defense, Attribution and Non-State 
Actor - Birth of the Unwilling or Unable Standard, 75 ZaöRV 451 (2015); Deeks, 
supra note 439, at 488; see also Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, LAWFARE: Who 
is on Board with “Unwilling or Unable”?, LAWFARE BLOG (Oct. 10, 2016), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-board-unwilling-or-unable 
[https://perma.cc/9F8W-GEUY] (cataloging “[s]tates that have used force against 
non-state actors on the territory of third States without the latter’s consent”). 
 448. See, e.g., Deeks, supra note 439, at 486. 
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nationals in foreign countries.449 In addition, as indicated above, 
Britain relied on this principle for its entry into U.S. territory and 
destruction of the Caroline in 1837.450 
c. An “Armed Attack” Includes an “Imminent Armed Attack.” 
Today, the international community also generally agrees that an 
“imminent armed attack” qualifies as an “armed attack.”451 At the 
same time, States distinguish between an “imminent attack” on the one 
hand, and an unjustifiable “pre-emptive attack” on the other hand.452 
A “pre-emptive attack” is an attack that is conducted to prevent some 
possible future attack by an unfriendly State in the future, e.g., by 
effecting regime change in the unfriendly State.453 
Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. primarily justified its attack on 
Afghanistan, not on the 9/11 attacks per se, but on its alleged right to 
respond to further “imminent attacks” being plotted against the U.S. 
by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.454 Initially, many States and international 
law experts rejected the U.S.’ claimed entitlement to repel an 
                                                                 
 449. See, e.g., Andrew W.R. Thomson, Doctrine of the Protection of Nationals 
Abroad: Rise of the Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
L. S. L. REV. 627, 657, n.193 (2012). 
The right of states to use force in the protection of nationals abroad flows 
from the universally accepted principle of international law that injury 
to a state’s national may be considered injury to the State itself; as such 
it is properly accommodated within the inherent right to self-defense 
including as exercised against non-state actors. The right arises in 
situations where nationals are at risk of death or grave injury, and the 
host (territorial) state is unwilling or unable to secure their safety, or 
otherwise take necessary action in compliance with its obligations under 
international law. 
Id. (quoting Allan Kessel, Canadian Practice in International Law, XLVII CAN. 
Y.B. OF INT’L L. 411–47 (2009)). 
 450. See text accompanying supra notes 378-390. 
 451. See, e.g., ZEMANEK, supra note 424, at ¶ 4. 
 452. See ZEMANEK, supra note 424, at ¶ 4. 
 453. See ZEMANEK, supra note 424, at ¶ 4. 
 454. See, e.g., Ryan T. Williams, Dangerous Precedent: America’s Illegal War in 
Afghanistan, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 563, 566-567 (2011). 
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“imminent armed attack” emanating from Afghanistan,455 even though 
the “imminent attack” principle had been recognized at least as long 
ago as the 1837 Caroline Incident.456 Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, 
however, technology has advanced tremendously and States 
understand that a wide variety of State and non-State actors possess 
the capacity to inflict widespread damage on their nationals and 
environment simply with the click of a computer mouse, without 
warning.457 As a result, the international community has come to agree 
that a victim State can use force in anticipatory self-defense, but only 
if the victim State can prove, on the basis of credible evidence, that the 
attack is “manifestly imminent.”458 
d. Intent to Harm Required? 
In the Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. 
United States of America)459 (hereinafter “The Oil Platforms Case”), 
the ICJ concluded that the U.S. was not entitled to bomb some of Iran’s 
off-shore oil platforms in self-defense after, among other events, one 
of its U.S.-flagged ships, the Sea Isle City, was hit by a missile while 
in Kuwaiti waters and another of its U.S.-flagged ships, the Bridgeton, 
was hit by a mine in international waters near Bahrain.460 This was so 
even though the U.S. had determined that Iranian forces fired the 
missile which hit the Sea Isle City and laid the mine which the 
Bridgeton hit.461 The ICJ explained that the U.S.’ claim of self-defense 
                                                                 
 455. See, e.g., Wouters & Ruys, supra note 408, at § 1(stating “customary 
international law throughout the Cold War era rejected the possibility of anticipatory 
self-defence, albeit not unanimously. Such was the status of the law before the 
promulgation of the Bush doctrine.”). 
 456. See Wouters & Ruys, supra note 408, at § 1. 
 457. See, e.g., Gene J. Koprowski, ‘Invisible’ Airplanes: Chinese, US Race for 
Cloaking Tech, FOX NEWS (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2013/
12/17/invisible-airplanes-chinese-us-scramble-for-cloaking-tech.html 
[https://perma.cc/5GM3-4ZWJ]; The Unseen Threat of Digital Warfare, TIME (Mar. 
22, 2016), http://time.com/4263185/digital-warfare/; Andy Extance, Military 
Technology: Laser Weapons Get Real, NATURE (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.nature.com/news/military-technology-laser-weapons-get-real-1.17613. 
 458. ZEMANEK, supra note 424, at ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 
 459. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment (Merits), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6) 
[hereinafter Oil Platforms Case]. 
 460. See Oil Platforms Case, supra note 459, at ¶¶ 64, 78. 
 461. See Oil Platforms Case, supra note 459, at ¶¶ 64, 78. 
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against Iran must fail, because, even if Iran had fired the missile that 
hit the Sea Isle City, that missile had been fired from such a distance 
that it “could not have been aimed at the specific vessel.”462 
Furthermore, the ICJ noted, “there was “no evidence that the 
minelaying . . . [by Iranian forces] was aimed specifically at the United 
States” or that the mine that the Bridgeton hit “was laid with the 
specific intention of harming that ship, or other United States 
vessels.”463 These statements could be interpreted to mean that a victim 
State must also prove that the perpetrator State or non-State actor 
“intended to harm” the victim State before the victim State can use 
force in self-defense against the perpetrator State or non-State actor.464 
It should be noted that the ICJ’s comments regarding the U.S.’ claim 
of self-defense in this case were dicta.465 That is, as the ICJ already 
had ruled against Iran on its claim that the U.S., in bombing Iran’s oil 
platforms, had violated the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations 
and Consular Rights between the U.S. and Iran (hereinafter the 1955 
Treaty),466 the ICJ did not need to address the U.S.’ claim of self-
defense.467 Furthermore, this aspect of the ICJ’s decision in The Oil 
Platforms Case has been criticized by a numerous writers, especially 
given that several multilateral treaties in effect at the time of this case 
prohibited the indiscriminate laying of mines in light of the danger that 
such mines posed to all ships.468 For both of these reasons, it is not 
clear that a victim State must prove “intent to harm” on the part of the 
perpetrator State or non-State actor before using force against that 
State or non-State actor in self-defense. 
                                                                 
 462. See Oil Platforms Case, supra note 459, at ¶ 64. 
 463. See Oil Platforms Case, supra note 459, at ¶ 64. 
 464. See, e.g., William H. Taft IV, Self Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 
29 YALE J. INT’L LAW 291, 295, 299, 302-303 (2004), http://digitalcommons.law.
yale.edu/yjil/vol29/iss2/3. UNC Article 51 and the customary international principle 
of self-defense were relevant in The Oil Platforms Case only because the U.S. had 
claimed that its action against Iran was justified under the security exception 
contained in the 1955 Treaty, and the ICJ then concluded “that the security exception 
in the 1955 Treaty implicitly encompassed general principles of self-defense.” Id. at 
296. 
 465. See, e.g., Taft, supra note 464, at 295; ZEMANEK, supra note 424, at ¶ 9. 
 466. See Oil Platforms Case, supra note 459, at ¶¶ 98-99. 
 467. See Taft, supra note 464, at 296. 
 468. See, e.g., Taft, supra note 464, at 302-303; ZEMANEK, supra note 424, at ¶ 9. 
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In fact, numerous legal theories support the conclusion that a target 
State should not be required to prove the locus State’s “intent to harm” 
before it can enter the locus State to remediate a MIEE in self-defense. 
These are discussed in the next subsection. 
v. Application of Current International Law to a Possible MIEE 
Although polluted air or water emanating from a locus State is an 
unconventional “weapon” in accordance with current international 
law, a MIEE nonetheless could be considered an armed attack, 
assuming that an armed attack is required by both UNC Article 51 and 
the customary international law principle of self-defense. An event is 
considered to be of a sufficient gravity to be considered an “armed 
attack” if it causes considerable loss of life and/or extensive 
destruction of property.469 A MIEE by definition threatens to cause 
considerable loss of life and/or extensive destruction of property.470 At 
the same time, the locus State may not permit any representatives of a 
target State to enter the locus State to ascertain whether the target State 
is facing such a threat. 
Furthermore, in the case of a MIEE, the directly culpable party for 
the occurrence of a MIEE typically would be a non-State actor, i.e., a 
private company. Yet, in such a situation, the target State ultimately 
should be able to demonstrate that the MIEE occurred because the 
locus State was “unwilling or unable to control” that non-State actor, 
because the locus State has the legal authority to regulate the behavior 
of that actor. Accordingly, the actions of the non-State actor should be 
attributable to the locus State.471 
Also, it would only make sense to permit a target State to enter the 
locus State if a MIEE was on-going and threatening to cause 
considerable loss of life and/or extensive destruction of property in the 
target State. That is, the self-defense principle permits a victim to 
attempt to repel a future attack, not retaliate for a completed attack.472 
If the target State has already suffered harm from a major 
environmental emergency in the locus State, its remedy would be 
                                                                 
 469. See, e.g., ZEMANEK, supra note 424, at ¶ 21. 
 470. See supra Introduction, §§ I, III. 
 471. See supra § II.C.2.iv.b. 
 472. See infra §§ II.C.2.iv.c, II.C.2.v.a. 
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limited to obtaining damages from the locus State for that harm.473 On 
the other hand, some may argue that a target State should not be 
permitted to enter a locus State to remediate a MIEE because an armed 
attack has not already occurred.474 However, as discussed above, today 
the general consensus in the international community is that a MIEE 
should qualify as an armed attack, so long as the target State can prove, 
based on credible evidence, that the considerable loss of life and/or 
extensive destruction of property threatened by the MIEE is manifestly 
imminent.475 Even if a target State in fact faces such a threat, it may 
very well be unable to produce the proof necessary to warrant its entry 
into the locus State, as the locus State could simply deny the target 
State’s request to enter for investigative purposes.476 
Finally, some may argue, in reliance on The Oil Platforms Case, that 
a MIEE cannot be considered an armed attack because neither the 
directly culpable party, a non-State actor, nor the locus State, intended 
to harm the target State.477 To be sure, the typical MIEE would be an 
accident caused by a non-State actor,478 but in at least many such cases, 
a locus State’s failure to properly regulate the non-State actor’s 
conduct could be considered to be intentional conduct under the Rome 
Statute’s definition of intent.479 That definition provides that 
intentional conduct includes conduct where the actor “is aware that it 
will occur in the ordinary course of events.”480 Moreover, a lack of 
intent to harm should not prevent the target State (or a multilateral 
environmental force, as discussed in the next section of this article) 
from entering the locus State to remediate the MIEE in order to prevent 
such harm from befalling the target State. This conclusion is supported 
by numerous legal theories. At a minimum, these theories include the 
                                                                 
 473. See supra § II.A. 
 474. See supra § II.C.2.iv. 
 475. See  supra § II.C.2.iv. 
 476. As it initially would be difficult for individuals outside of the locus State to 
access the information needed to assess whether a MIEE is occurring in the locus 
State, the proposal discussed in Section III of this article includes the right of the 
“Green Helmets” at UNEP to enter the locus State initially solely for the purpose of 
ascertaining whether a MIEE is occurring there. See infra § III. 
 477. See Taft, supra note 464. 
 478. See Taft, supra note 464. 
 479. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 
at 30(2)(b) (July 17, 1998) (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
 480. Id. 
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self-defense principle in domestic criminal law, emergency exceptions 
to trespass in international and domestic law, and the precautionary 
principle in environmental law. Each of these theories is discussed in 
turn below, but, in general, an “intent to harm” requirement is 
inappropriate, because the harm threatening the target State is no less 
severe when neither the non-State actor nor the locus State intends to 
harm the target State.481 
a. The Self-Defense Principle in Domestic Criminal Law 
As in the two Caroline Incident criteria for self-defense in 
international law, a person generally must prove the following two 
elements in order to establish a claim of self-defense in domestic 
criminal law around the world: (1) necessity of the use of force; and 
(2) proportionality of the amount of force used.482 In those States, if a 
claimant honestly believes that both the use of force and the amount of 
force used were necessary but at least one of these beliefs was 
objectively unreasonable, then the claimant is considered to have 
established an “imperfect” self-defense claim.483 In that case, he or she 
                                                                 
 481. See, e.g., Taft, supra note 464, at 302 (“States have a right of self-defense so 
that they can protect their national security and deter attacks against them, concerns 
that are implicated just as much when States are subjected to indiscriminate attacks 
as when they are subjected to targeted attacks.”). 
 482. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense: Reasonable Beliefs or 
Reasonable Self-Control?, 11 NEW CRIM. L.REV. 51, 53 (2008). See also U.S. Model 
Penal Code § 3.04 (“The use of force in self-defense is permitted when it is necessary 
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reasonably believed that the amount of force used was necessary.  Simons, supra 
note 482, at 52-53. France similarly requires both a subjective and objective test of 
self-defense. Simons, supra note 482, at 52, n.2 (citations omitted). The U.K. and a 
few U.S. states require that the claimant prove only his or her subjective belief in the 
propriety of the use of the force and the amount of force used. Simons, supra note 
482, at 52. In Germany, the claimant must prove the two elements of “necessity” and 
“proportionality”, but, with respect to the “proportionality” element, he or she is 
required only to prove that his or her use of force was not grossly disproportionate 
to the threat. Simons, supra note 482, at 52. 
 483. See, e.g., In re Christian S., 7 Cal. App. 4th 768, 778 (1994) (“An honest but 
unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril to life 
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will not be completely exonerated but rather will be found guilty of a 
lesser crime.484 
No country which recognizes the principle of self-defense in 
domestic criminal law requires the party claiming self-defense to prove 
that the aggressor intended to harm the claimant. For example, if a 
person accidentally releases a machete in the direction of the claimant 
rather than intentionally throwing it in the direction of the claimant, 
the claimant would be entitled to attempt to stop the machete from 
reaching him or her, even if, in doing so, he or she harmed the person 
who accidentally released the machete. The claimant faces the same 
threat of harm, whether the other party’s actions were intentional or 
accidental. In short, there is no “intent” requirement in domestic self-
defense law and there is no reason to include an intent requirement in 
international self-defense law. 
b. Exceptions to Trespass in International and Domestic Law 
As this article contemplates a target State’s use of force in the locus 
State, arguably it is more appropriate to analyze such a use of force 
according to property law concepts, such as trespass and eminent 
domain. In fact, the international community already recognizes 
several different “emergency exceptions” to trespass.485 
                                                                 
or great bodily injury negates malice aforethought, the mental element necessary for 
murder, so that the chargeable offense is reduced [under the theory of imperfect self-
defense] to Penal Code 192 manslaughter.”); see also, California Criminal Jury 
Instruction 571 (Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense or Imperfect 
Defense of Another, “A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to 
voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed a person because (he/she) acted in 
(imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect defense of another). If you conclude the 
defendant acted in complete (self-defense/ [or] defense of another), (his/her) action 
was lawful and you must find (him/her) not guilty of any crime. The difference 
between complete (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) and (imperfect self-
defense/ [or] imperfect defense of another) depends on whether the defendant’s 
belief in the need to use deadly force was reasonable. The defendant acted in 
(imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect defense of another) if: 1 The defendant 
actually believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/ {insert name of third party}) was 
in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury; AND 2 The 
defendant actually believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to 
defend against the danger; BUT 3 At least one of those beliefs was unreasonable.”) 
 484. See In re Christian S., at 778. 
 485. See infra §§ II.C.2.v.b(1)-II.C.2.v.b(5). 
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(1) Non-Refoulement 
To begin with, the customary international law principle of “non-
refoulement” requires any country to permit into its territory any 
person who has reached its shores and can demonstrate that he or she 
possesses a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her home 
country based on any one of several bases.486 While otherwise a 
refugee’s entry into a foreign country would be considered a trespass 
in domestic property law (entry onto private property without the 
permission of the landowner487), the principle of non-refoulement 
constitutes an emergency exception to the law of trespass. 
(2) Safe Harbors on the Sea and in the Air 
Similarly, most countries have entered into the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (otherwise known as the Chicago 
Convention)488 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (“UNCLOS”)489 which provide a “safe harbor” in any airport or 
seaport in the world in the event of any emergency.490 These are 
                                                                 
 486. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33(1), July 28, 1951, 19 
U.N.T.S. 6259 (“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would 
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.”). 
 487. See, e.g., Allred v. Harris, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1386, 1390 (“As a general rule, 
landowners and tenants have a right to exclude persons from trespassing on private 
property; the right to exclude persons is a fundamental aspect of private property 
owners.”); Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 4th 668, 674 (1993) (“‘A 
trespass is an invasion of the interest in the exclusive possession of land, as by entry 
upon it. . . .’”); Staples v. Hoefke, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1397, 1406 (1987) (“Trespass is 
an unlawful interference with possession of property”). 
 488. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat 1180, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295 (entered into force April, 4 1947), http://www.icao.int/publications/
pages/doc7300.aspx [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. 
 489. UNCLOS, supra note 147. UNCLOS codified the customary international 
principle of force majeure, which countries had respected for hundreds of years prior 
to the adoption of the UNCLOS. See, e.g., Christopher F. Murray, The Right of Entry 
for Reasons of Force Majeure or Distress in the Wake of the Erika and the Castor, 
63 OHIO STATE L. J. 1465, 1466 n.3-5 (2002). 
 490. See Chicago Convention, supra note 488, at art. 25. Article 25 provides: 
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additional examples of the international community recognizing 
exceptions to trespass into their territories. 
(3) States’ Rescues of their Nationals on Foreign Soil 
The international community for hundreds of years has permitted 
the entry into another country for the purpose of rescuing a national 
when the host country is unwilling or unable to protect that national 
from harm.491 In general, this practice has been justified on the basis 
                                                                 
Each contracting State undertakes to provide such measures of assistance 
to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable, and to 
permit, subject to control by its own authorities, the owners of the aircraft 
or authorities of the State in which the aircraft is registered to provide 
such measures of assistance as may be necessitated by the circumstances.  
Id. See also UNCLOS, supra note 147, at art. 17. Articles 17-18 of the UNCLOS 
likewise provide: 
Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-
locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. . . . 
Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes 
stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to 
ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or 
distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or 
aircraft in danger or distress. 
Chicago Convention, supra note 488, at art. 25. 
 491. See text accompanying supra note 449; see also D.W. BOWETT, SELF-
DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (Praeger 1958). The International Law 
Commission (ILC) studied the subject of diplomatic protection, and in the course of 
that study incidentally considered the rescue of nationals abroad. Thomson, supra 
note 449, at 645. The ILC’s Report, under the direction of Special Rapporteur J.R. 
Dugard, concluded that “the use of force [was] . . . an acceptable means of diplomatic 
protection for the purpose of the ‘rescue of nationals.’” Thomson, supra note 449, at 
645. Draft Article 2 of this report states: 
The threat or use of force is prohibited as a means of diplomatic 
protection, except in the case of the rescue of nationals where: (a)The 
protecting State has failed to secure the safety of its nationals by peaceful 
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of the customary international principle of self-defense, as an attack 
on a foreign national was considered to be an attack on that national’s 
country.492 However, over the years, such rescues have been justified 
under a number of legal theories,493 including as a “qualified privilege 
of necessity”, which provides a right to rescue one’s national in a 
foreign host nation even if that host nation has exercised due diligence 
in attempting to protect that national.494 This legal basis is very similar 
to the doctrine (discussed below) of a privileged trespass in U.S. 
domestic law.495 
                                                                 
means; (b) The injuring State is unwilling or unable to secure the safety 
of the nationals of the protecting State; (c) The nationals of the protecting 
State are exposed to immediate danger to their persons; (d) The use of 
force is proportionate in the circumstances of the situation; (3) The use 
of force is terminated, and the protecting State withdraws its forces, as 
soon as the nationals are rescued. 
Thomson, supra note 449, at 645 (quoting John R. Dugard, Special Rapporteur on 
Diplomatic Protection, INT’L LAW COMM’N, U.N. Doc, A/CN.4/506 (Mar. 7, 2000)). 
 492. See, e.g., Kunig, supra note 265, at ¶ 6. 
 493. See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 449, at 640. 
 494. BOWETT, supra note 491, at 89-90. 
 495. See infra § II.A.1.v.b(4). Presumably many rescues abroad are kept out of the 
news in order increase the chances of the rescue’s success and perhaps protect 
sensitive information, but there are many well-known examples of rescues of 
nationals in foreign territories both in past years and recent years. For example, the 
U.S. Government rescued U.S. citizens from Cuba in 1898 and from Haiti in 1915. 
See, e.g., BOWETT, supra note 491, at 97-98. Examples in more recent years include 
Israel’s rescue of its nationals in Entebbe, Uganda in 1976 and the U.S.’ attempted 
rescue of its nationals in Tehran, Iran in 1980. See U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1939th 
mtg. at 14, U.N. doc. S/PV.1939 (July 9, 1975) (U.N. Security Council statement 
approving of Israel’s raid on the basis of defense of its nationals in accordance with 
Article 51 of the UNC); NATALINO RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD 
THROUGH MILITARY COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 45 
(Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 1985) (In defending his authorization of the rescue mission 
to the U.S. Congress, then President Carter stated: “In carrying out this operation, 
the United States was acting wholly within its right, in accordance with Article 51 of 
the [UNC], to protect and rescue its citizens where the government of the territory in 
which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them.”). For a number of 
years, the former Soviet Union criticized Western nations “who purported to exercise 
the right to protect nationals abroad.” Thomson, supra note 449, at 659. In contrast, 
its successor, the Russian Federation, has embraced the doctrine and rescued a 
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As indicated, the doctrine permitting States to rescue their nationals 
abroad is very well-accepted.496 Furthermore, it provides a particularly 
close analogy to the right of a target State to protect its nationals and 
environment at home who are threatened by an environmental 
emergency in another, locus State. In both cases, the victim State’s 
nationals are threatened with severe harm emanating from a foreign 
State and, generally speaking, that foreign State is unwilling or unable 
to protect the victim State’s nationals. Like the international 
community recognizes the doctrine of rescuing nationals abroad, it 
should recognize the right of a target State (or a multilateral force) to 
enter a locus State to remediate a MIEE. 
(4) Trespass for Necessity/Abatement of a Nuisance 
A very old concept in domestic property law is that a person is 
entitled to enter a private property owner’s land without the 
landowner’s permission if necessary to avoid injury to persons or 
property.497 Such a trespass is referred to as a “trespass by necessity.” 
This doctrine assumes that the owner bears no responsibility for the 
trespasser’s emergency and hence the trespasser is required to 
reimburse the owner for any damages incurred as a result of his or her 
trespass.498 By way of analogy, if a target State (or a multilateral force) 
were to enter a locus State to investigate a MIEE and it was then 
determined that a MIEE was not occurring, then the target State or 
multilateral force could be required to reimburse the multilateral force 
and/or the locus State for the costs incurred in the investigation. On the 
other hand, the Chicago Convention and the UNCLOS do not provide 
for the owner of the vessel in distress to pay compensation to a foreign 
nation when the owner utilizes a foreign port in an emergency, 
presumably because each signatory is benefitted as well as burdened 
by these reciprocal rights of trespass (or easements).499 
                                                                 
number of Russian nationals from Georgia and elsewhere in recent years. See 
Thomson, supra note 449, at 659-662. 
 496. See, e.g., Kunig, supra note 265, at ¶ 6. 
 497. See, e.g., River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, (1877) 2 App. Cas. 743; 
Southport Corporation v. Esso Petroleum Co., Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 773, (Develin J.), 2 
Q.B. 82, C.A. (1954), A.C. 218, H.L. (1956). 
 498. See, e.g., River Wear Commissioners; Southport Corporation. 
 499. See Chicago Convention, supra note 488; UNCLOS, supra note 147. 
2017] BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL 309 
 
In domestic property law, an easement to abate a private or public is 
perhaps even more apropos to the situation where a MIEE occurring 
in a locus State is threatening to cause widespread harm to one or more 
target States. An easement to abate a nuisance is an easement which 
permits the government representing the victim(s) to enter the land of 
the culpable owner and abate the nuisance.500 A private nuisance is 
defined as “a substantial non-trespassory invasion of another’s interest 
in the private use and enjoyment of land and is either ‘intentional and 
unreasonable’ or ‘unintentional and otherwise actionable under the 
principles controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for 
abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.’”501 A public nuisance 
(which, from the perspective of this article, is the more applicable type 
of nuisance) is “the invasion of rights which one possesses as a 
member of the public.”502 Similarly, if a MIEE is occurring in a locus 
State and that emergency is threatening the nationals or environment 
of one or more target States, the target State(s), or a multilateral force 
on their behalf, should be permitted to enter the locus State and abate 
the nuisance. 
(5) The Precautionary Principle 
As discussed above, the precautionary principle holds that it is better 
to err on the side of caution when making decisions regarding 
protection of the environment. Again, this principle holds that, 
“[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”503 This 
principle likewise supports allowing a target State or a multilateral 
force to enter a locus State to investigate and then remediate a MIEE 
if necessary. 
                                                                 
 500. See, e.g., Eccles v. Ditto, 23 N.M. 235, 249 (N.N. 1917). 
 501. John E. Bryson & Angus Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L. Q. 241, 264-65 (1972) 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822); see also California Civil Jury 
Instruction CACA 2021. 
 502. See Bryson & Macbeth, supra note 501, at 242, n.1. 
 503. See supra § II.A. 
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III. SOLUTION: THE GREEN HELMETS 
As indicated above, the international community likely will 
experience an increasing number of MIEEs in the coming years.504 
International law at present does not provide a clear remedy when a 
MIEE is occurring in a locus State and that MIEE threatens widespread 
harm to one or more target States. 
When a serious environmental emergency occurs somewhere in the 
world, most governments and nationals around the world will want to 
know the following information: 
1) Which pollutant(s) was/were released in the locus State? 
2) Is any of the pollutants released capable of causing 
significant harm to people or the environment in general? 
3) If the answer to question 2 is in the affirmative, will the 
pollutant(s) reach their State if the locus State takes no 
action? 
4) If the answer to question 3 is in the affirmative, will the 
locus State be willing and able to halt the spread of the 
pollutant(s) to their State, a target State? 
5) If the answer to question 4 is in the negative, will their 
nationals or environment suffer major harm as a result? 
6) If the answer to question 5 is in the affirmative, can any 
group anywhere in the world prevent the pollutant(s) from 
reaching the target State, and if so, what is that group? 
In addition, if the answer to question 6 is in the affirmative, the 
government and nationals of any target State most likely would desire 
that a group of the most knowledgeable environmental experts in the 
world, using the most effective tools and equipment, attempt to halt 
the spread of the pollutant(s) to their target State. 
Unfortunately, the government and nationals of any target State 
threatened with such harm typically cannot obtain accurate 
information regarding such an accident.505 Also, the locus State often 
refuses to accept external assistance in its remediation and clean-up 
                                                                 
 504. See text accompanying supra notes 1-3. 
 505. See supra § I.A. 
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efforts.506 At the same time, the U.N. Security Council would possess 
the power to order a multilateral force to enter the locus State and 
investigate the accident and attempt to remediate it, if need be.507 
However, regardless of the harm threatening the target States and the 
world in general, any one of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council could veto any resolution authorizing such 
enforcement action, especially if the locus of the accident is its own 
territory.508 A target State most likely would be entitled to enter a locus 
State to remediate an emergency determined to be a MIEE,509 but it 
very well could find it impossible to determine whether a MIEE has 
occurred without first entering the locus State to investigate the 
situation. Furthermore, the locus State could deny the target State 
permission to enter its territory.510 At the same time, it’s safe to say 
that no State wants some other national or multinational body to direct 
remediation and clean-up efforts every time a pollutant is released 
within its territory. Taking these various concerns into account, a new 
scheme for handing major international environmental emergencies is 
necessary. 
Here, it is proposed that the international community sign a new 
treaty in which it authorizes the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) to enter the locus State following an 
environmental accident, whenever any other State requests that UNEP 
enter the locus State to investigate whether the accident is a MIEE. 
Any State which desires that UNEP investigate such an accident 
should deliver its request for the same to the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (CPR) of the U.N. Environmental Assembly. The 
CPR will, in turn, deliver the request to UNEP and organize UNEP’s 
visit to the locus State. 
UNEP is the logical multilateral organization to perform this task, 
as it has been the voice for the environment on the international level511 
                                                                 
 506. See supra § I.A. 
 507. See supra § II.C.1. 
 508. See text accompanying supra notes 373-375. 
 509. See supra § II.C.2.v. 
 510. See supra § II.C.2.v. 
 511. UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme Annual Report 2015 United 
Nations, at 5 (2016). 
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since its creation in 1972,512 and it can immediately coordinate and 
deliver a wide range of expert personnel, equipment, mobile 
laboratories, chemicals, products and services to any location in the 
world.513 In the event of a nuclear accident, UNEP would perform 
these tasks in coordination with personnel from the IAEA and 
UNSCEAR, two U.N. agencies already charged with providing timely, 
unbiased information regarding a nuclear accident and helping to abate 
any radiation fallout from such an accident.514 
UNEP already exists, so the international community would not 
need to create it or locate funding for it. Moreover, it is a multinational 
organization,515 so it would have no bias toward either the locus State 
                                                                 
 512. UNEP was established by U.N. G.A. Res. 2997 (XXVII) at 43 (Dec. 15, 
1972). Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides: UN Documentation: 
Environment, U.N., http://research.un.org/en/docs/environment/unep (last visited 
July 11, 2016). 
 513. Environmental Emergencies: Learning from Multilateral Response to 
Disaster, OCHA 9-10, 13, 16 (Feb 16, 2009), https://www.unocha.org/
sites/unocha/files/EnvEm_LearningFromMultilateralResponse.pdf; Guidelines for 
Environmental Emergencies, Version 1, Joint UNEP/OCHA Environment Unit, 
U.N., at 5 (2009) [hereinafter Environmental Emergencies]. 
 514. The IAEA was established as an autonomous international organization 
through a treaty referred to as the IAEA Statute on October 23, 1956, and it became 
operational on July 29, 1957. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Statute, 276 
UNTS 3; About the Statute of the IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/about/about-statute 
(last visited July 11, 2016). Its mandates are to promote the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy, prevent the use of nuclear energy for any military purpose, and encourage 
countries to adopt nuclear safety standards. Id. at arts. II, III, XII. Although 
technically not a United Nations entity, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations 
General Assembly and the Security Council. The United Nations Scientific 
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) was established by the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1955. UNGC Res. 913 (X) (Dec. 3, 1955). 
Report of the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Fifty-
sixth session (July 10-18, 2008) to the U.N. G.A., Sixty-third Session, Supp. No. 46, 
http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/41/084/41084475.
pdf) (clarifying that “the mandate of the Committee has been to undertake broad 
reviews of the sources of ionizing radiation and of the effects of that radiation on 
human health and the environment. In pursuit of its mandate, the Committee 
thoroughly reviews and evaluates global and regional exposures to radiation; and it 
evaluates evidence of radiation-induced health effects in exposed groups. . . . The 
Committee also reviews advances in the understanding of the biological mechanisms 
by which radiation-induced effects on health or on the environment can occur.”). 
 515. See UNEP, supra note 511; CHARLES L. HARPER & MONICA SNOWDEN, 
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY 310 (Routledge 6th 3d. 2017). 
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or any particular target State in investigating and remediating any 
MIEE.516 Furthermore, UNEP already works in combination with the 
U.N.’s Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) in 
an entity called the Joint Environmental Unit (JEU).517 The JEU could 
                                                                 
 516. Note that, at present, UNEP, on its own, has no power to enter a State without 
the permission of the government of that State. See, e.g., Frank N. Laird, Information 
and Disaster Prevention, in LEARNING FROM DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER 
BHOPAL 221 (U. Penn U. Press 1994). 
 517. Environmental Emergencies, supra note 513, at 1. In 1992, the U.N. Centre 
for Urgent Environmental Assistance was established in Geneva on a trial basis. 
Environmental Emergencies, supra note 513, at 8. The Centre reviewed the 
international response to environmental emergencies during the previous ten years 
and identified many deficiencies. Environmental Emergencies, supra note 513, at 8. 
One of the main recommendations of this study was that the United Nations should 
provide its environmental and humanitarian assistance in a more coordinated 
manner, and, as a result, the Joint Environmental Unit (“JEU”), consisting of UNEP 
and the U.N. Department for Humanitarian Affairs was established in 1993. JEU 
became operational in 1994. Environmental Emergencies, supra note 513, at 9. Then, 
in 1998, the U.N. Department for Humanitarian Affairs was reconstituted as the 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance. Environmental 
Emergencies, supra note 513, at 9. Both UNEP and the OCHA have large staffs of 
environmental disaster experts, and the JEU can also rely on many other 
governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who are 
available to assist in an environmental emergency. See, e.g., Tools and Services for 
Disaster Response, in ASIA DISASTER RESPONSE, at Ch. 3, U.N. OCHA, 
https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/dms/ROAP/Promotional%20Materials/T
he%20Guide-Web-FINAL.pdf (stating that “[a] range of international technical 
teams can be mobilized within hours of a disaster to support a Government’s relief 
efforts”); Environmental Emergencies, supra note 513, at 12, 18, 40, 66 (indicating 
that both UNEP and the OCHA can call upon staff in offices all around the world to 
provide assistance in environmental emergencies). For example, personnel in Green 
Cross International offices in thirty-four offices around the world routinely assist the 
JEU regarding environmental emergencies. Environmental Emergencies, supra note 
513, at 13. The JEU is available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, three-
hundred and sixty-five days a year. Environmental Emergencies, supra note 513, at 
13. Since its inception in 1994, the JEU has provided assistance on environmental 
emergencies in 84 countries. Rene Nijenhuis, The International Environmental 
Emergencies Response System: A Case Study of Supertyphoon Haiyan (Yolanda), 
the Philippines, 6 ASIAN J. OF ENVT. AND DISASTER MGMT. 175, 175 (2014), 
http://www.eecentre.org/Modules/EECResources/UploadFile/Attachment/AJEDM
_vol6_no2_Environmental_Emergencies.pdf. In addition to helping countries 
combat environmental emergencies through the JEU, UNEP provides a wide range 
of services and advice regarding how to avoid and prepare for environmental 
emergencies. See, e.g., Disasters and Conflicts, Why Does Risk Reduction Matter, 
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enter the locus State if the locus State desires OCHA’s humanitarian 
assistance. When UNEP, or JEU, as applicable, investigates and 
remediates international environmental emergences, it could be known 
as the “U.N. green helmets”518 in reference to the U.N. peacekeepers 
who are known as the “U.N. blue helmets.”519 
After receiving a request to investigate an environmental accident, 
UNEP would enter the locus State and determine as quickly as possible 
whether a MIEE exists with respect to any target State which has 
requested this information. UNEP would declare that a MIEE exists 
with respect to any particular target State when: 
                                                                 
UNEP, https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/disasters-conflicts/what-we-
do/risk-reduction/why-does-risk-reduction-matter last visited July 11, 2016) (stating 
that “UNEP works to prevent and reduce the impacts of disasters on vulnerable 
communities and countries through improved ecosystems management.”). 
Furthermore, UNEP has many years of experience helping countries recover and 
rebuild following an environmental emergency. See, e.g., Disasters and Conflicts, 
About Us, UNEP, http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/ (last visited July 11, 
2016) (see activities described under in sections labelled “Post-Crisis Environmental 
Assessment” and “Post-Crisis Environmental Recovery”). 
 518. See, e.g., Malone, Conceptual Framework, supra note 353, at 519. Various 
writers have used the adjective “green” to describe a group of environmental experts 
ready to assist with environmental emergencies around the world. For example, 
former U.S.S.R. President Mikhail Gorbachev, following the Chernobyl nuclear 
accident, established a group in 1992 called “Green Cross International,” which he 
described as a “Red Cross for the environment.” Our History, GREEN CROSS INT’L, 
http://www.gcint.org/who-we-are/our-history/ (last visited July 11, 2016). At 
approximately the same time, Roland Widerkehr, a Swiss parliamentarian, founded 
an organization with the same objective called “World Green Cross.” Id. In 1993, 
these two organizations merged to form the organization Green Cross International 
(GCI). Id. GCI experts are available to assist countries with environmental 
emergencies at the invitation of such countries, and today there are GCI offices in 
more than thirty countries. Id. In addition, a few people and entities have directly 
proposed the creation of an international team of environmental experts to be known 
as the “green helmets.” See, e.g., MIKHAIL GORBACHEV & GREEN CROSS 
INTERNATIONAL, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV: PROPHET OF CHANGE 44 (Clearview Books 
2011) (noting that Austria at one point proposed the creation of “international 
protection units called ‘U.N. Green Helmets.’”); Malone, Conceptual Framework, 
supra note 353 (arguing that the U.N. Security Council’s mandate be interpreted so 
as to permit the creation of a “green helmet” international environmental force). 
 519. Military, United Nations Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/
military (last visited Nov. 27, 2017) (referring to U.N. peace-keepers as “blue 
helmets” because they wear blue helmets when they serve in this role). 
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A. There is at least a 40% chance520 that the target State will 
suffer “major environmental harm” due to the environmental 
accident unless remedial action is taken; and 
B. There is at least a 40% chance521 that the locus State will 
be unwilling or unable to prevent such “major environmental 
harm” from occurring.  
If UNEP declares that a MIEE exists with regard to one or more 
target State(s), UNEP will proceed to remediate the emergency so long 
as: 
A. The benefits of conducting the remediation exercise 
outweigh the harm that the exercise could cause; and 
B. At least one target State wishes UNEP to remediate the 
emergency. Any time that 100% of the target State(s) 
threatened with major environmental harm from a particular 
emergency desire that some other agency (e.g., a regional 
agency such as the ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for 
Transboundary Haze Pollution522) attempt to remediate the 
emergency, that other agency, rather than UNEP, will do so. 
In this proposal, “major environmental harm” is defined as: 
(a) The death or catastrophic injury of twenty-five (25) or 
more humans; or 
(b) The devastation of the environment. 
The “catastrophic injury of a human being” is defined as “any injury 
that results in permanent disability, long-term medical problems or 
shortened life expectancy.”523 
The environment will be considered to be “devastated” if: 
                                                                 
 520. A percentage rate of less than 50% is used in order to promote protection of 
the environment in accordance with the precautionary principle (Rio Declaration, 
supra note 251, Principle 15), and a 40% figure indicates that the risk of this event 
nonetheless is substantial. 
 521. Rio Declaration, supra note 251, Principle 15 
 522. AATHP, supra note 200, at art. 12 and Annex. 
 523. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF 
PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT (Amer. Med. Assn. 6 ed. 2007). 
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(i) 5% or more of the land mass of the country will be unfit 
for human, animal, or plant habitation for 10 years or more 
as a result of the accident; or 
(ii) 5% or more of the fresh water resources in the country 
will be unfit for human, animal, or plant consumption for 10 
years or more as a result of the accident; or 
(iii) 5% or more of the marine life of the country over the 
course of the next 10 years will die, be deformed, or have a 
shortened life expectancy as a result of the accident; or 
(iv) 5% of more of the land animals in the country over the 
course of the next 10 years will die, be deformed, or have a 
shortened life expectancy as a result of the accident; or  
(v) 5% or more of the air in the country will be unfit for 
human, animal, or plant consumption for 10 years or more 
as a result of the accident. 
Without question, the key to this proposed scheme is an acceptable 
definition of a “major environmental harm” that demonstrates proper 
respect for each nation’s environment as well as each nation’s 
sovereignty. The definition of “major environmental harm” proposed 
here attempts to satisfy these concerns. This definition takes into 
account injury to land, water, and air. It also considers effects on all 
three types of living organisms – humans, animals, and plants. Finally, 
this definition is derived from a number of international law sources. 
These include, for example, the ICJ’s adoption over time of a 
definition of “armed attack” that essentially is an “effects test”, i.e., if 
a State suffers “considerable loss of life and extensive destruction of 
property [at the hands of another State],” then an armed attack in the 
sense of Article 51 of the UNC has occurred.524 The definition 
proposed here is also based on the prohibition, during war, against 
intentionally causing, or engaging in actions expected to cause, 
“severe, widespread, and long-lasting environmental harm” contained 
in Article 35(3) of the Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva 
                                                                 
 524. See ZEMANEK, supra note 424, at ¶ 10 (citing A. CONSTANTINOU, THE RIGHT 
OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, 63-64 (Sakkoulas 
Athènes 2000)). 
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Conventions525 and the similar prohibition against the “military or any 
other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having 
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects” contained in Article I of the 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use 
of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD).526 Finally, this 
definition is supported by the factors that the U.N. High Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change suggested the Security Council 
consider in determining whether various situations constitute threats to 
peace,527 the factors that Daniel Bethlehem proposed States consider 
in determining whether an armed attack is imminent and if so, whether 
it should be responded to,528 and the factors that the drafters of the 
                                                                 
 525. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
June 8, 1997, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 35(3). 
 526. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), art. I, Dec. 10, 1976, 1108 
U.N.T.S. 151, art. I. 
 527. UNITED NATIONS, A MORE SECURE WORLD: ONE SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: 
REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES, AND CHANGE ¶ 
207(a)-(e ), U.N. G.A. 59th Sess., U.N. Doc, A/59/565 (Dec. 2004), 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf (“In 
considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Security 
Council should always address - whatever other considerations it may take into 
account - at least the following five basic criteria of legitimacy: (a) Seriousness of 
threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently 
clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of military force? In the case of 
internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic 
cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or 
imminently apprehended? (b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of 
the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other 
purposes or motives may be involved? (c) Last resort. Has every non-military option 
for meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for 
believing that other measures will not succeed? (d) Proportional means. Are the 
scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary 
to meet the threat in question? (e) Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable 
chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with 
the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of 
inaction?). 
 528. Daniel Bethlehem, comment, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s 
Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack, 106 AMER. J. 
INT’L LAW 770, 775-76 (2012) (stating, in his Principle 8 that “[w]hether an armed 
attack may be regarded as ‘imminent’ will fall to be assessed by reference to all 
relevant circumstances, including (a) the nature and immediacy of the threat, (b) the 
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International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) proposed that the Security Council consider in determining 
whether various situations constitute threats to peace.529 
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, the international community likely will experience 
an increasing number of major international environmental 
emergencies in the coming years.530 As discussed at length above, 
international law at present does not provide any clear plan for how 
the international community should proceed when such an emergency 
occurs in a locus State and that emergency threatens to cause 
widespread harm to one or more target States. The U.N. Security 
Council most likely would possess the power to order a multilateral 
force to enter the locus State and investigate and remediate the 
emergency, if necessary.531 However, any of the five permanent 
                                                                 
probability of an attack, (c) whether the anticipated attack is part of a concerted 
pattern of continuing armed activity, (d) the likely scale of the attack and the injury, 
loss, or damage likely to result therefrom in the absence of mitigating action, and (e 
) the likelihood that there will be other opportunities to undertake effective action in 
self-defense that may be expected to cause less serious collateral injury, loss, or 
damage.  The absence of specific evidence of where an attack will take place or of 
the precise nature of an attack does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is 
imminent for purposes of the exercise of a right of self-defense, provided that there 
is a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that an armed attack is imminent.”) 
“The ‘reasonable and objective’ formula – in paragraph . . . 8 – requires that the 
conclusion is capable of being reliably supported with a high degree of confidence 
on the basis of credible and all reasonably available information.” Id. 
 529. ICISS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 32, ¶ 4.19 (Dec. 2001), 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (stating “military 
intervention for human protection purposes is justified in two broad sets of 
circumstances, namely in order to halt or avert: large scale loss of life, actual or 
apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate 
state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large 
scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, 
forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape[ ]”). The International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) explicitly stated that the following would 
fall within these parameters: “overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, 
where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, 
and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened.” Id. at 33, ¶ 4.20. 
 530. See text accompanying supra notes 1-3. 
 531. See supra II.C.1. 
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members of the U.N. Security Council could veto a resolution 
authorizing such action.532 On the other hand, while a target State that 
is actually threatened with widespread harm should possess the power 
to enter the locus State to protect its own nationals and environment, 
the locus State could prevent the target State from entering for the 
purpose of determining the level of threat.533 This article proposes the 
adoption of a new treaty that would provide a workable plan for how 
the international community should respond to possible major 
international environmental emergencies in the future. While the 
details of such a treaty undoubtedly would evolve over time, it is hoped 
that this article will initiate serious consideration of such a treaty. 
                                                                 
 532. See text accompanying supra notes 373-375. 
 533. See supra § II.C.2.v. 
